ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Before: GARTH, BECKER, Circuit Judges, and FULLAM, District Judge*fn*
In this sex discrimination case we are presented with the question whether 28 U.S.C. § 1291 vests this court with jurisdiction over an appeal from a district court order which denied an interim award of attorney's fees under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Because the district court's order neither was "final" in the usual sense of a full disposition of all the parties' claims on the merits, nor was it "final" in terms of the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Co., 337 U.S. 541, 93 L. Ed. 1528, 69 S. Ct. 1221 (1949), we will grant the appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal.
Up until March 23, 1979, Marion Yakowicz was employed by the Legal Division of the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue ("the Department") as an "Administrative Assistant I." On that date, the Department downgraded her classification to that of "Clerk III," stating that it was taking that action because the tasks that Yakowicz was required to perform were primarily clerical rather than administrative.
Yakowicz objected to the reclassification immediately, filing a grievance on March 23, 1979, pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement in effect at that time. Several days later, on April 2, 1979, she filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission ("PHRC") charging that her classification had been downgraded because of her sex. The PHRC referred Yakowicz's complaint to the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). After the required period of time had passed without action by the EEOC, the United States Department of Justice informed Yakowicz of her right to bring a federal civil rights action under Title VII. Accordingly, on October 3, 1980, Yakowicz filed a complaint in federal district court alleging that the defendants -- the Secretary of Revenue of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and various other officials responsible for personnel decisions*fn1 -- had demoted her "not on the basis of [lack of] merit or performance or any other valid criteria, but on the basis of plaintiff's sex." Complaint P13, Appendix at 13.
In essence, Yakowicz's complaint charged that her work was at least as complex and administrative in content as work performed by men in the Department, but that her work was deemed "clerical" simply because she was a woman. Claiming "a loss in pay, a loss in job classification, loss of status, loss of potential for promotion, and a degrading of her outstanding record of employment," Yakowicz sought an order
(a) directing defendants to reinstate plaintiff as an Administrative Assistant I;
(b) awarding plaintiff all pay lost by her as a result of her demotion;
(c) directing defendants to restore to plaintiff her right to perform the tasks she previously had authority to perform;
(d) directing defendants to restore plaintiff to the same status with regard to promotion she would have had ...