Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, Criminal Division, at No. 652 A, B, C of 1980. Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, Criminal Division, at No. 651, A, B of 1980.
John J. Gallagher, Philadelphia, for Milano, appellant.
Thomas A. Bergstrom, Philadelphia, for Terra, appellant.
David E. Fritchey, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Beck, Watkins and Hoffman, JJ.
[ 300 Pa. Super. Page 252]
Appellants contend that their prosecutions were not timely commenced. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of sentence.
[ 300 Pa. Super. Page 253]
Following a lengthy joint state-federal investigation, the Commonwealth obtained, on March 18, 1980, arrest warrants charging appellants with certain drug offenses*fn1 and criminal conspiracy*fn2 arising from their activities between March 28, 1978 and April 13, 1978. Appellants were arrested on March 19, 1980, and informations were filed on April 16, 1980. Following the denial of their motions to dismiss the charges on the ground that the statute of limitations had expired, appellants were found guilty of all charges in a non-jury trial. The lower court subsequently denied their post-verdict motions and imposed sentence. This appeal followed.
There is no dispute that these prosecutions would be barred by the statute of limitations if not commenced by April 13, 1980. Relying upon section 77 of the Act of March 31, 1860, P.L. 427, § 77, as amended by the Act of April 6, 1939, P.L. 17, § 1; 19 P.S. § 211 (repealed) (hereinafter section 77 of the Act of 1860),*fn3 appellants contend that the
[ 300 Pa. Super. Page 254]
filing of informations commenced their prosecution on April 16, 1980, three days too late. Relying upon subsection 108(e) of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 108(e) (repealed), however, the Commonwealth argues that the obtaining and execution of arrest warrants by March 19, 1980 timely commenced these prosecutions. The lower court applied subsection 108(e) of the Crimes Code and, therefore, held the prosecutions to be timely.
Appellants argue that section 77 of the Act of 1860 is controlling because it was not expressly repealed by section 108 of the Crimes Code. We disagree. A statute may be repealed by express legislative act or by implication. Commonwealth, Department of Education v. First School, 471 Pa. 471, 482, 370 A.2d 702, 707 (1977); Newton Estate, 354 Pa. 146, 148, 47 A.2d 229, 230 (1946); Girard Trust Co. v. Philadelphia, 336 Pa. 433, 436, 9 A.2d 883, 884 (1939). "Express repeal is not necessary where a substitute statute is manifestly intended for a former act." Id., 336 Pa. at 436-37, 9 A.2d at 884-85, citing Bosack v. Schuylkill County, 311 Pa. 157, ...