No. 2046 Philadelphia, 1981, Appeal from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Criminal Division, at No. MR No. 81-912675
Joseph Scott O'Keefe, Norristown, for appellant.
Jane Cutler Greenspan, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Brosky, Wieand and Beck, JJ.
[ 306 Pa. Super. Page 473]
This appeal arises from the defendant's summary offense conviction June 30, 1981 at a trial de novo in the Common Pleas Court of Philadelphia for violating Section 3102 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code.
[ 306 Pa. Super. Page 474]
First, the defendant alleges that his conviction is invalid because he was charged with violating one section of the code, Section 3102, but was actually convicted of violating another provision of the code, Section 6308. Second, the defendant alleges that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction.
For the following reasons, we quash this appeal instead of addressing the above issues on their merits.
The general rule is that "a defendant may appeal only from a final judgment of sentence and an appeal from any prior order will be quashed as interlocutory." Commonwealth v. Myers, 457 Pa. 317, 319, 322 A.2d 131, 132 (1974); Commonwealth v. Nugent, 291 Pa. Super. 421, 423, 435 A.2d 1298, 1299 (1981).
As we pointed out in a recent case, entry of the judgment of sentence is a two-step process involving both imposition of sentence and entry on the docket. Commonwealth v. Nugent, supra, 291 Pa. Super. at 425 n. 8, 435 A.2d at 1300 n. 8.
In the case at bar, it is apparent that only the second step was taken.
A docket entry dated June 30, 1981 indicates that the defendant was adjudged guilty and was to pay $44 in fines and costs. However, nothing in the record shows that the trial judge sentenced the defendant in court or executed an order for judgment of sentence. Therefore, no judgment of sentence has been entered, no ...