federal civil rights damage claims for their legislative conduct. See also Groff v. Eckman, 525 F. Supp. 375 (E.D.Pa.1981) (personal immunity for township supervisors charged with helping to enact an allegedly unconstitutional zoning ordinances).
Plaintiff argues, however, that defendants' failure to reinstate him was a non-immune administrative act and not an immune legislative act. Hence, he asseverates that the immunity which protects local legislators is not directly implicated. We agree.
No bright line delineates a township's administrative actions from its legislative functions. For example, zoning and land-use control, although generally considered legislative functions, are viewed as administrative acts for specified purposes. Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogolslavsky, 626 F.2d at 611, n. 5. Hence, whether defendants' failure to rehire plaintiff was an administrative or a legislative function does not admit to facile resolution. However, we believe that a municipality's employment decisions, whether they regard hiring, firing or a failure to reinstate, are essentially administrative in nature, this notwithstanding the fact that a legislative body is the responsible decisionmaker. Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogolslavsky, 626 F.2d at 613, n. 7.
Municipal decisionmakers, passing on administrative questions, possess qualified, good faith, not absolute immunity. Williams v. Anderson, 562 F.2d 1081, 1101 (8th Cir. 1977) (qualified immunity for school board members and superintendent); Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090, 1101 (5th Cir. 1975) (qualified immunity for county supervisors personally sued for prison conditions); Curry v. Gillette, 461 F.2d 1003, 1005 (6th Cir. 1972) cert. denied sub nom., Marsh v. Curry, 409 U.S. 1042, 93 S. Ct. 529, 34 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1973) (qualified governmental immunity for alderman). We accordingly conclude that defendants Hoover and Kaylor possess good faith immunity; an insufficient basis upon which to dismiss the complaint. Only absolute immunity would permit dismissal of the complaint at this stage. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 100 S. Ct. 1920, 64 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1980) (complaint need not allege bad faith; qualified immunity must be pleaded by defendant.) Assertion of good faith immunity normally awaits resolution at trial. Williams v. Anderson, 562 F.2d at 1101, n. 33; Shoemaker v. Allender, 520 F. Supp. 266, 270 (E.D.Pa.1981). However, claims of good faith immunity can, in some cases, be resolved upon motion for summary judgment. See United States v. Kruvczuk, No. 77-3685 (E.D.Pa. April 6, 1982), slip op. at 5. In any case, plaintiff alleges that defendants acted "intentionally and maliciously"
, which, at this stage, overcomes any claim of good faith immunity.
In denying defendants' motion to dismiss we note that the federal claim for relief is predicated upon an impermissible reason: failure to reinstate an alleged violation of 11 U.S.C. § 525, i.e., discrimination by a governmental entity against a person who has sought protection under the bankruptcy act. As the Supreme Court noted, bankruptcy affords debtors a "new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort". Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 648, 91 S. Ct. 1704, 1710, 29 L. Ed. 2d 233 (1971), quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244, 54 S. Ct. 695, 699, 78 L. Ed. 1230 (1934). However, in deciding whether to hire a police officer, local governments may properly consider, as a factor, the fact that the applicant has been unable to manage his financial affairs. Marshall v. District of Columbia Government, 182 U.S. App. D.C. 105, 559 F.2d 726, 729-30 (D.C.Cir.1977) (police officers are frequent targets of bribery attempts; local governments may properly attempt to insulate police departments from corrupting influences by seeking out qualified applicants who can successfully manage their financial affairs and are less susceptible to bribery.)
One additional point merits comment. Plaintiff's complaint names each defendant "individually and as Township Supervisor of Mount Joy Township
Given the broad, liberal construction of federal pleading we have assumed that plaintiff seeks recovery from the Township itself as well as from the individually named defendants. As read, we believe that the complaint states a claim against the Township. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S. Ct. 1398, 63 L. Ed. 2d 673 (1980). However, we do not believe that the Court is required to guess the identity of the defendants from which plaintiff seeks recovery. Hence, within fifteen (15) days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall amend his complaint and name Mount Joy Township as a party defendant if that is consonant with his theory of the case.
Finally, having denied defendants' motion to dismiss Count I of the complaint, we likewise deny defendants' motion to dismiss the pendent claims. An appropriate order will issue.