No. 2258 Philadelphia, 1980, Appeal from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Trial Division, Law, at No. 2582 September Term, 1977.
Rames J. Bucci, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Herbert J. Hutton, Philadelphia, for appellees.
Cavanaugh, Cirillo, and Hoffman, JJ.
[ 306 Pa. Super. Page 172]
Appellant contends that the lower court erred in granting appellees' motion for summary judgment. Because triable issues of fact remain, we reverse and remand for trial.
On September 21, 1977, appellees, beneficiaries of several life insurance policies issued by appellant, sued to recover additional funds arising from the policies' double indemnity clauses as a result of the insured's death by gunshot wound. Upon the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the lower court granted judgment for appellees. This appeal followed.
Summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035(b). It is to be entered, however, only in the clearest of cases when no doubt exists as to the absence of a triable issue of fact. Granthum v. Textile Machine Works, 230 Pa. Superior Ct. 199, 326 A.2d 449 (1974).
The three insurance policies at issue provided for double indemnity for the beneficiaries if the insured died from accidental causes.*fn* The only evidence offered as to
[ 306 Pa. Super. Page 173]
the cause of the insured's death was a death certificate, stating that he had been "shot during an altercation." Police investigations revealed no "conclusive results about the surrounding circumstances of the shooting." (Lower Court Op. at 2) The record indicates, however, that at least one witness, the insured's brother, could testify as to the circumstances surrounding the insured's death and that evidence pertaining to the insured's drunken state may also exist.
Appellant contends that the gunshot wound suffered during the "altercation" precludes double recovery because it falls under the injuries intentionally inflicted, use or influence of any intoxicant and taking part in any altercation exclusions of Policy I and the "committing or attempting to commit an assault or felony" exclusion of Policies II and III. Appellees, however, maintain that the gunshot wound was accidental for Policy I purposes, but claim that the insured died through the criminal activity of another for Policy II and III purposes.
It is often the case that although the basic facts are not in dispute, the parties in good faith may nevertheless disagree about the inferences to be drawn from these facts, what the intention of the parties was as shown by the facts . . . Under such circumstances the case is ...