No. 575 Philadelphia, 1981, Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County at No. 4450 of 1979. (CRIMINAL)
Owen W. Nash, Assistant Public Defender, Media, for appellant.
Frank T. Hazel, District Attorney, Media, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Spaeth, Popovich and Montgomery, JJ.
[ 299 Pa. Super. Page 228]
This is a direct appeal from the judgment of sentence imposed after appellant, Wilbur Williams, was convicted by a jury of burglary and theft. Appellant's sole contention on appeal is that his right to a speedy trial under Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100 was violated. We disagree and affirm the judgment of sentence.
The facts pertinent to our consideration of the instant appeal are as follows:
On August 25, 1979, a criminal complaint was filed against appellant in Delaware County charging him with burglary and related offenses. The Commonwealth therefore had 180 days from the filing of the complaint, or until February 21, 1980, to bring appellant to trial.*fn1 Since appellant was not tried until July 21, 1980, 331 days after the complaint was filed, the time beyond the prescribed period either must be excluded from the 180 day computation, Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(d),*fn2 or justified by an order granting an extension pursuant to the terms of the rule, Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(c).*fn3
[ 299 Pa. Super. Page 229]
commencement of trial "for a period of 120 days after the receipt by the Office of the District Attorney of Delaware County of notice that the defendant is lodged in a Pennsylvania institution."
The Commonwealth then received notice of appellant's incarceration in Philadelphia County on March 31, 1980, and the outstanding bench warrant was changed to a detainer. On April 29, 1980, appellant was transferred from the Philadelphia Detention Center to Delaware County. Following the denial of two petitions to dismiss under Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(f), appellant's trial commenced on July 21, 1980.
Appellant now contends that his right to a speedy trial under Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100 was violated. More specifically, appellant argues that because the Commonwealth failed to exercise the requisite due diligence under Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(c) prior to applying for its extension, the Commonwealth must be charged with having constructive notice of appellant's incarceration in Philadelphia County as of March 19, 1980, the date the extension order was granted. Hence, appellant argues, the Commonwealth's 120 day extension ran four days prior to the commencement of his jury trial and thereby entitles him to a discharge. This contention is ludicrous.
To begin with, it is well-settled that a criminal defendant who accepts the status of bail during the pendency of court proceedings assumes the responsibility of ...