Constitution or the laws of the United States which were infringed by his removal across state lines.
Plaintiff asserts that rights secured by state extradition statutes were violated by defendant's failure to comply with the state extradition procedures set forth in these statutes. The obligation imposed on the states to extradite fugitives upon demand of the state from which the fugitive has fled is rooted in the Constitution, Art. IV, § 2, cl. 2,
and is implemented by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3182.
Under the current federal extradition statute: (1) the demanding state's executive authority must produce a copy of an indictment or an affidavit (sworn before a magistrate), certified as authentic by the governor or magistrate and charging the fugitive with a crime; (2) the executive authority of the asylum state must have the fugitive arrested and detained and notify the demanding state, accordingly; (3) the fugitive must be delivered to the agent of the demanding state or be discharged within thirty days of his arrest if no agent appears.
In addition, the Supreme Court in Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80, 29 L. Ed. 544, 6 S. Ct. 291 (1885), recognized that the governor of the asylum state must determine: (1) whether the person demanded is substantially charged with a crime and (2) whether the person demanded is a fugitive from justice from the demanding state. Id. at 95. Individuals have a federal right to challenge the second determination by writ of habeas corpus. The prisoner, before being extradited, also has a federal right, enforceable through writ of habeas corpus in the asylum state, to require that a neutral judicial officer of the demanding state has made a determination of reasonable grounds or probable cause that he has committed an offense. Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 58 L. Ed. 2d 521, 99 S. Ct. 530 (1978).
Realizing that the procedural guidelines in the federal statute needed explication, fifty-two states, including Pennsylvania and Delaware adopted the UCEA which provides additional extradition procedures. Under the UCEA as adopted in Pennsylvania, Price, as an agent of the demanding state, was required to follow certain procedures in obtaining a Delaware warrant from that state's governor.
Under Delaware law, plaintiff had the right to appear before a judge or justice of the peace to be informed of the demand for his surrender, his right to counsel and the right to apply for a writ of habeas corpus.
Further, he had the right to waive those rights in writing but only after they had been fully explained to him.
Whether a failure to comply with state extradition procedures is actionable under section 1983 has generated differing opinions. Some courts have reasoned that federal constitutional provisions for extradition as well as the federal or state statutes implementing them were enacted for the benefit of the states to facilitate the discovery and delivery of fugitives from justice. Since they were not intended primarily to safeguard the fugitive, there are no individual rights granted by the extradition statutes. Hines v. Guthrey, 342 F. Supp. 594, 595 (W.D. Va. 1972); Johnson v. Buie, 312 F. Supp. 1349 (W.D. Mo. 1970); Crawford v. Lydick, 179 F. Supp. 211 (W.D. Mich. 1959), aff'd (per curiam) 280 F.2d 426 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 849, 81 S. Ct. 93, 5 L. LEd. 2d 72 (1960).
The great weight of authority, however, is to the contrary. I agree with those courts which recognize that federal or state extradition procedures are enacted, at least in part, for the benefit of the fugitive, so that individual rights are, indeed, granted. See Wirth v. Surles, 562 F.2d 319, 322 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 933, 55 L. Ed. 2d 531, 98 S. Ct. 1509 (1978); Sanders v. Conine, 506 F.2d 530, 532 (10th Cir. 1974). See also Ross v. Meagan, 638 F.2d 646 (3d Cir. 1981) (dicta -- plaintiff may be entitled to damages under § 1983 for knowing violation of the Pennsylvania UCEA); Crumley v. Snead, 620 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1980) (recognizing cause of action under § 1983 for violation of prisoner's right to challenge extradition via writ of habeas corpus); Brown v. Nutsch, 619 F.2d 758 (8th Cir. 1980) (recognizing cause of action under § 1983 for improper extradition under extradition clause and statute); McBride v. Soos, 594 F.2d 610 (7th Cir. 1979) (recognizing cause of action under § 1983 for violation of federal and state extradition procedures.) See generally Note Extradition: Computer Technology and the Need to Provide Fugitives with Fourth Amendment Protection in Section 1983 Actions, 65 Minn. L. Rev. 891 (1981).
Both the statutes of Pennsylvania and Delaware provide that certain fugitive rights must be observed before extradition. The right to be informed by a magistrate of the right to counsel, the right to test the arrest by petition for habeas corpus, and the right of non-waiver except by written consent, 11 Del. Code § 2510, § 2526, are requirements which "patently benefit the prisoner, not the state." Wirth v. Surles, 562 F.2d at 322 (quoting Sanders v. Conine, 506 F.2d 530, 532 (10th Cir. 1974)). Under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9144(a), the prosecuting attorney must comply with certain formalities in presenting a written application for the return of the person charged. While these procedures may benefit the state by expediting the extradition process, they also benefit the fugitive by assuring that he is properly described, identified and that his arrest is required by "the ends of justice."
Having decided that the UCEA secures certain pre-extradition rights to the plaintiff, I must decide whether those rights are federal in nature and thus protected by section 1983.
At least one court has held that state imposed extradition procedures derive from state rather than federal law, so that a cause of action does not arise under section 1983 for violations of these procedures. See Raffone v. Sullivan, 436 F. Supp. 939 (D. Conn. 1977), remanded mem., 595 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir. 1979) (recognizing, however, that conduct shocking to the conscience may give rise to a due process violation). Cf. Hines v. Guthrey, 342 F. Supp. 594 (W.D. Va. 1972); Johnson v. Buie, 312 F. Supp. 1349 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (no § 1983 cause of action for violation of federal extradition procedures where requirements of due process met.)
However, I find the better view to be that expressed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Brown v. Nutsch, 619 F.2d 758, 764 n.8 (8th Cir. 1980). In that case, the court recognized a cause of action under section 1983 for violations of the extradition clause and statutes, stating that "individuals have the right not to be imprisoned or dealt with by the states in disregard of the safeguards provided by the Constitution and the statutes of the United States and applicable state statutes." Id. at 764. The court narrowed the scope of its holding by stating that not "every violation of state statutes implementing the constitutional clause and federal statute" . . . gives rise to a § 1983 cause of action. Id. at 764 n.8. "Only those violations of state statutes which also violate the minimal requirements of the constitutional clause and the federal statute give rise to a section 1983 action." Id.
Thus, where violations of the UCEA also violate the minimal requirements of the Constitution and 18 U.S.C. § 3182, a section 1983 cause of action is stated. Cf. McBride v. Soos, 594 F.2d 610 (7th Cir. 1979) (characterizing UCEA rights as derived from federal law and recognizing § 1983 cause of action for violation of state and federal extradition procedures. Id. at 613); Wirth v. Surles, 562 F.2d 319 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 933, 55 L. Ed. 2d 531, 98 S. Ct. 1509 (1978) (where violation of state UCEA procedures causes deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution and federal statutes, § 1983 cause of action is stated. Id. at 322); Sanders v. Conine, 506 F.2d 530 (10th Cir. 1974) (recognizing § 1983 action for violation of extradition power by non-compliance with "applicable law," not distinguishing between federal and state procedures, Id. at 532).
Based on the above authority, I hold that to the extent that plaintiff has alleged facts which are in dispute and which, if proved, would constitute a violation of state extradition statutes, as well as a violation of the extradition clause and its implementing federal statute, he has stated a cause of action under § 1983.
Since the essential facts surrounding plaintiff's interstate transportation are disputed, I cannot grant summary judgment as to the section 1983 claim.
Trooper Price further asserts that, as a matter of law, he is qualifiedly immune from suit because he acted in good faith in his dealings with plaintiff. As a state official acting within the scope of his official duties, defendant Price is entitled to qualified immunity from damage suits. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90, 94 S. Ct. 1683 (1974). Such immunity varies in scope,
The variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based. It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct.