federal taxation and filing requirements so long as they do not occupy positions traditionally filled by private persons. Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 458, 98 S. Ct. 1153, 1162, 55 L. Ed. 2d 403 (1978) (collecting cases). Although we hesitate to place too great an emphasis on the applicability of tax case law to the matter at bar, the fact remains that defendant has consistently and repeatedly represented itself as an entity apart from the school district. This fact is highly relevant to our consideration of whether the school district's immunity shields the library. Cf. Wright v. Columbia University, 520 F. Supp. 789, 792 (E.D.Pa.1981) (University's representation that it was a single entity rather than a composite of discrete entities considered in determining the nature of the university's component parts and their relationship to the entire university.).
Finally, the court order establishing the library clearly intended that the two entities, the Library and the School District, would maintain separate identities. In appointing the school district as trustee, the court noted that the library should comply "as nearly as possible with the purpose for which (it had been originally) incorporated and ... accumulated its present assets." In an analogous context, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered whether Temple University was a state "agency" for specified purposes. Holding that an infusion of capital, coupled with legislation which reorganized the university but maintained all rights and privileges "heretofore granted", did not alter the University's private status, the court concluded that the legislature's language revealed an "express ... intent to preserve Temple's status...." Mooney v. Board of Trustees of Temple University of the Commonwealth System of Higher Education, 448 Pa. 424, 430, 292 A.2d 395 (1972). Here, the trust declaration that the trustee comply "as nearly as possible" with the original purposes of the private trust, evidences an intention not to have the library act as a public entity.
Accordingly, we conclude that application of traditional trust principles and the library's perceived image of itself, compel the conclusion that the library is not an "agency" by virtue of its relationship with the school district. As such, it is not shielded by the school district's immunity.
Our holding that the library is not a governmental agency also disposes of defendant's alternative motion to dismiss Count IV of the complaint which seeks punitive damages. Defendant's entire argument on this point is that the library, qua political subdivision, cannot be subjected to such a damage claim. The Order of Hermits of St. Augustine v. County of Philadelphia, 4 Clark 120 (1847). But see Carpenter v. Dizio, 506 F. Supp. 1117, 1125 (E.D.Pa.1981); Hennigan v. Atlantic Refining Co., 282 F. Supp. 667, 682-83 (E.D.Pa.1976), aff'd, 400 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 904, 89 S. Ct. 1739, 23 L. Ed. 2d 216 (1969). Because we conclude that the library is not a governmental agency, plaintiff may properly seek punitive damages.
Lastly, plaintiff has filed a complaint directly against the third-party defendant, the architect who designed the library. Moving for partial summary judgment as to Count IV of plaintiff's complaint, the architect has established, by way of affidavit, that he had no knowledge of any prior accident involving the statue and that he neither selected nor placed the statue. Finally, he swears that he was not involved in the upkeep and care of the library. Hence, he asserts, he is not properly liable to a claim for punitive damages. In order to withstand this Rule 56 motion, plaintiff must adduce facts tending to show that the architect's conduct was "more serious than the mere commission of the underlying tort." Franklin Music v. American Broadcasting Co., 616 F.2d 528, 542 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying Pennsylvania law). Since plaintiff has failed to demonstrate or adduce any facts tending to show that the architect's conduct was willful, malicious or in wanton disregard of plaintiff's rights, Phillip v. U. S. Lines Co., 240 F. Supp. 992, 994 (E.D.Pa.1965), aff'd, 355 F.2d 25 (3d Cir. 1966) (per curiam), we will grant the third-party defendant's motion for summary judgment as to punitive damages.