of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit or otherwise accomplishing an object with the intention of initiating a series of such acts." 42 Pa.Cons.Stat. § 5322(a)(1)(ii).
Assuming that the interview is such a single act, the initial question, raised by subsection (c) of the Long Arm Statute, is whether this tort action against an allegedly negligent service station operator can be said to have arisen from that Pennsylvania interview between the defendant as a potential lessee and the lessor of the service station. Clearly it cannot. The interview may have been required by the lessor prior to executing the lease; the lease may have been required to enable Zisa to operate the service station. In that sense, but for the Pennsylvania interview, Zisa might not be a defendant in this case. However, it does not follow from this "but for" contact with Pennsylvania, that this cause of action arose from that interview. This action has nothing to do with the lease.
Cottrell alleges that Zisa negligently failed to remove or treat a greasy substance which covered the walkway to the ladies bathroom. (Complaint PP 2 and 3). Plaintiff's injuries were not the result of anything that Zisa did in Pennsylvania nor were they related to any contact of record with Pennsylvania. Cf., Union National Bank v. L. D. Pankey Institute, 284 Pa.Super. 537, 426 A.2d 624 (1980) and Goff v. Armbrecht Motor Truck Sales, Inc., 284 Pa.Super. 544, 426 A.2d 628 (1980) (employing minimum contacts analysis, the cases held that the cause of action did not arise from defendant's contacts within the forum state).
This case differs from Haeberle v. Texas International Airlines, 497 F. Supp. 1294 (E.D.Pa.1980), which held that Pennsylvania negotiations of aircraft leasing contracts constituted sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state and that the cause of action arose from those contacts. Haeberle was an action to recover damages for breach of those contracts, so that subsection (c) was clearly satisfied. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has chosen to restrict the reach of its Long Arm Statute by virtue of subsection (c). Since the Pennsylvania Long Arm Statute does not provide an adequate jurisdictional basis for this action, we need not decide whether Zisa's contact with Pennsylvania meets the due process standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945). An appropriate Order follows.
AND NOW, this 27th day of January, 1982, for the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum, it is ORDERED that:
1. Defendant Zisa's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is GRANTED.
2. Defendant Collins Shipbottom Sunoco, not having been served, is also dismissed without prejudice.
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