No. 1316 Philadelphia, 1980, Appeal from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas, Civil Action-Law, Montgomery County, No. 79-16775.
Dean B. Stewart, Jr., Norristown, for appellant.
Bernard J. McLafferty, Norristown, for appellees.
Price, Montemuro and Van der Voort, JJ. Price, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
[ 294 Pa. Super. Page 180]
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County granting appellees' motion for partial summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the instant appeal is quashed.
[ 294 Pa. Super. Page 181]
Appellees, on August 28, 1979, filed a complaint in assumpsit against appellant to recover work loss and survivor's loss benefits as provided under Pennsylvania's No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act.*fn1 Subsequently, appellant filed an answer, new matter, and a counterclaim. Appellees filed a reply to the new matter and, in addition, filed a request for admissions from appellant.
On March 28, 1980, appellees, receiving no answer or objection to their request for admissions, filed a motion for partial summary judgment asking the court to award them the full limit of work loss benefits less sums already paid by appellant.
On May 1, 1980, the lower court entered an order granting appellees' motion for partial summary judgment pursuant to Montgomery County local Rule of Civil Procedure No. 302(d). This rule requires the filing of a responsive brief within thirty (30) days from the filing of the moving party's brief. Since appellant failed to file its brief within such time, the lower court entered its order granting appellees' partial summary judgment in the amount of $14,166.57 on the work loss benefits issue.*fn2
On May 7, 1980, appellant's request to the court to rescind its order was denied, and on May 27, 1980, the court also denied appellant's petition for reconsideration. On May 29, 1980, appellant filed this appeal.
Although neither party on appeal has challenged the jurisdiction of this court to resolve this matter, it is fundamental that neither silence nor agreement of the parties will confer jurisdiction where it otherwise would not ...