The opinion of the court was delivered by: MARSH
On April 14, 1981, the petitioner, Arthur Lee Roberts, entered a plea of guilty to all counts of a four count indictment charging him with two armed bank robberies in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a), 2113(d) and 2. On May 29, 1981, Mr. Roberts received a general sentence of twenty (20) years as to counts 1 and 2, and the same sentence as to counts 3 and 4, to be served concurrently.
On February 24, 1981, an indictment was filed against petitioner charging him with two counts of bank robbery under Title 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (counts 1 and 3 of the indictment) and two counts of armed bank robbery pursuant to Title 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (counts 2 and 4 of the indictment). At his arraignment on March 3, 1981, the defendant was notified of the contents of a memo of this court dated February 26, 1981 that the trial in this matter would be set for April 6, 1981, at 9:30 a.m. At the arraignment, the defendant pled not guilty to all four counts of the indictment. The defendant was represented by Attorney Robert McClenahan at his arraignment. Prior to the trial, the defendant filed pretrial motions to suppress eyewitness identification as well as motions for discovery and inspection and to compel disclosure of exculpatory material and information and a motion for severance of the defendants in the case and for severance of the respective offenses in the case. Because of the filing of these pretrial motions, an evidentiary hearing on said motions was held on April 8, 1981, at 10:00 a.m. The parties were previously advised by the court that trial would proceed immediately following the hearing on pretrial motions. However, at the hearing, because of a request of the defendant's counsel, trial was set for April 22, 1981 at 9:30 a.m.
As a result of the defendant's motion for discovery, this court made an in camera inspection of the investigative notes of law enforcement officials in this case, and an order was entered on April 9, 1981, one day after the day of the hearing, stating that the court found no exculpatory material that the government was bound to release to the defendant under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963).
At the hearing, the government produced three eyewitnesses who identified the defendant in a lineup. Because of the familiarity of one of these witnesses to the other participants in the lineup, his testimony was suppressed. However, the bank teller and another police officer, Officer Riley Smoot, were permitted to testify and their evidence was not suppressed.
In addition, the court denied the defendant's motion to sever defendants upon the trial of the case and also defendant's motion to sever offenses upon the trial of the case.
On April 9, 1981, one day after the hearing on pretrial motions, the court was advised that the defendant wished to change his plea from not guilty to guilty. It was obvious the defendant decided to plea as a result of the hearing held the previous day. Accordingly, a date for change of plea was set for April 14, 1981 at which time the court took the defendant's plea to all four counts of the indictment as guilty.
In his motion to vacate his sentence, the petitioner has set forth four grounds in support of his motion as follows:
1. Petitioner's plea was involuntary in that he was not made aware of the essential elements of armed bank robbery.
2. Petitioner's plea to double counts of bank robbery and armed bank robbery stemming from the same criminal episode was involuntary since petitioner was never advised that his plea to bank robbery and armed bank robbery arising out of the same criminal episode constitutes double jeopardy.
3. The plea entered by petitioner was involuntary and in violation of petitioner's right to due process of law insofar as the petitioner's plea of guilty was entered without an understanding of the evidence marshalled against him.
Petitioner's trial counsel was called as a witness at the hearing. Counsel testified that he advised the defendant of all of the elements of both robbery and armed bank robbery, and further advised the defendant what was necessary to be proved by the government to establish both offenses. Furthermore, in his plea form, which was adopted as a part of the record of the change of plea hearing (docketed at no. ...