Appeal from the Order of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board in case of John F. Mramor v. United States Steel Corporation, No. A-77722.
Roger L. Wise, with him Louis A. Raimond, for petitioner.
William R. Caroselli, McArdle, Caroselli, Spagnolli & Beachler, for respondent, John F. Mramor.
President Judge Crumlish, Jr. and Judges Rogers and Williams, Jr., sitting as a panel of three. Opinion by President Judge Crumlish. Judge Rogers concurs in the result only.
[ 62 Pa. Commw. Page 394]
United States Steel Corporation appeals an order of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board affirming a referee's award*fn1 of benefits to John F.
[ 62 Pa. Commw. Page 395]
Mramor for permanent and total disability resulting from an occupational disease as defined in Section 108(n) of The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act.*fn2
Mramor, a 40-year employee of U.S. Steel who was exposed to silica, coke, coal, sand and limestone dusts in various job assignments, stopped working due to shortness of breath and chest pains in 1976. He was examined by a pulmonary disease specialist, Dr. J. D. Silverman, who diagnosed his disease as mixed-dust pneumoconiosis, with resulting complications of pulmonary emphysema and chronic bronchitis.
Our scope of review where the party with the burden of proof has prevailed before the fact finder is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, an error of law was committed, or the necessary findings of fact were unsupported by competent evidence. D.L. Clark Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 49 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 535, 537, 411 A.2d 1269, 1270 (1980).
U.S. Steel, while admitting that Mramor was exposed to a disease, asserts that he has failed to prove the disease's causal relation to the industry or occupation or that the incidence of the disease is substantially greater in the industry or occupation than in the general populace,*fn3 hence, Mramor has failed to show the "occupational impact of the disease."*fn4
[ 62 Pa. Commw. Page 396]
We conclude that the referee's finding that Mramor has met the requirements of Section 108(n) (2) and (3) of the Act is supported by competent, sufficient and substantial evidence, in that the referee's conclusions are fair and reasonable inferences to be drawn from the entirety of Dr. Silverman's testimony. See Spartan Abrasive Co. v. ...