No. 547 Philadelphia, 1980, Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County, Criminal Term, No. 86--1979.
Raymond P. Kashimba, Public Defender, Stroudsburg, for appellant.
Linda W. Miller, Assistant District Attorney, Stroudsburg, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Brosky, Johnson and Popovich, JJ.
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After a trial by jury, the appellant, Antoinette Harrison, was found guilty of Forgery (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4101) and Receiving Stolen Property (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925). Post-trial motions were timely filed, denied and the appellant was sentenced to serve a period of imprisonment of no less than three (3) months nor more than six (6) months, as well as being ordered to make restitution and to pay the cost of prosecution.
On appeal, appellant asserts (1) the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support the forgery conviction, (2) the forgery and receiving stolen property convictions were contrary to the evidence, or, alternatively, to the weight of the evidence, and (3) the lower court erred in refusing to admit various pieces of evidence at trial. Because the evidence amply supports the verdict, and the assignment of error is without merit, the judgment of sentence is affirmed.
In assessing the appellant's first contention, which requests that judgment be arrested, "the sufficiency of the evidence must be evaluated upon the entire trial record. All of the evidence must be read in light most favorable to the
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Commonwealth, and it is entitled to all reasonable inferences arising therefrom. The effect of such a motion [to arrest judgment] is to admit all the facts which the Commonwealth's evidence tends to prove." (Emphasis in original) Commonwealth v. Meadows, 471 Pa. 201, 205-206, 369 A.2d 1266, 1268 (1977); accord Commonwealth v. Slout, 288 Pa. Super. 471, 432 A.2d 609 (1981); Commonwealth v. Nappi, 288 Pa. Super. 240, 431 A.2d 1027 (1981). When the evidence is viewed in this manner, it becomes clear that appellant's sufficiency argument must fail.
On November 17, 1978, a young woman carrying a small child entered Metzgar's Market in Tannerville, Monroe County, Pennsylvania. The woman presented Louise Metzgar, an owner of the store, a check for $150.00 for cashing. The check was drawn by Columbia Accident and Health Insurance Company to the order of David S. Marsh, and was dated July 15, 1978. The woman represented that the signature already on the check was that of her husband. However, when she was unable to produce any identification, Mrs. Metzgar requested that she sign the check as a condition precedent to payment. The woman complied and signed her name as that of Susan Marsh. With the added signature, Mrs. Metzgar did not hesitate to honor the check.
On or about July 15, 1978, David S. Marsh did not receive his regular disability check from Columbia. Upon inquiry, he learned that it was mailed and that Columbia had received the cancelled check, which indicated that it had been cashed at Metzgar's Market and endorsed by "David S. Marsh" and "Susan Marsh." At trial, both David Marsh and his wife, known since childhood as "Sue" even though her given name was Veronica, denied endorsing the check.
When appellant took the stand, she testified that she and her two year old daughter spent all of November of 1978 with her father in Youngstown, Ohio. (N.T. 88) Although the appellant denied ever being in Metzgar's Market, or even knowing where it was ...