No. 2027 October Term, 1979, Appeal from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Civil Division at No. 5520 February, 1979
John G. Jenemann, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Drew S. Dorfman, Philadelphia, for appellee.
Cercone, President Judge, and Wickersham and Brosky, JJ.
[ 289 Pa. Super. Page 102]
This action, which stems from a disputed insurance claim, was commenced by appellee's filing of a motion to compel the appellant insurance company to appoint an arbitrator in accordance with its obligation under the insurance agreement. Appellant, the defendant below, made no answer to the motion which was granted on March 29, 1979. However, on April 19, 1979, appellant filed a petition to vacate the March 29 order. Appellee filed preliminary objections to that petition which appellant answered arguing that the filing of preliminary objections was an improper response to
[ 289 Pa. Super. Page 103]
his petition. By order of September 6, 1979, the preliminary objections were granted and appellant's petition was dismissed. This appeal is from the September 6 order. Because that order is interlocutory, the appeal is quashed.
The order is not a final one from which an appeal may be taken as a matter of right pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 341. A final order is one which ends the litigation, or alternatively, disposes of the entire case. Piltzer v. Independence Federal Savings and Loan Association of Philadelphia, 456 Pa. 402, 319 A.2d 677 (1974) (citing cases); Robinson v. Pocono Futures, Inc., 275 Pa. Super. 44, 418 A.2d 602 (1980). Because the order in question effectively compelled the appointment of an arbitrator but did not end the litigation, we conclude that it is interlocutory, and as such is not appealable unless expressly made so by statute or by the Supreme Court Rules which are promulgated pursuant to its statutory authority. Piltzer, supra. See also 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 1701, 5105 (Supp.1980); Pa. R.A.P. 311. The insurance policy pursuant to which appellee sought arbitration makes no mention of the Arbitration Act of 1927*fn1 in its "arbitration" section.
The Act applies only to arbitration agreements which expressly or impliedly provide for its application as opposed to that of the common law. P. Agnes, Inc. v. Philadelphia Police Home Association, 439 Pa. 448, 266 A.2d 696 (1970). See Wechsler v. Newman, 286 Pa. Super. 81, 87 n. 5, 389 A.2d 611, 613 n. 5 (1978).
As our court stated in Coleman v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 233 Pa. Super. 441, 335 A.2d 413 (1975):
[ 289 Pa. Super. Page 104]
deleted) (quoting John A. Robbins Co., Inc. v. Airportels, Inc., 418 Pa. 257, ...