Appeal from the Order of the Pennsylvania Crime Victim's Compensation Board in case of In Re: Claim of Barbara J. Gloeckl. Victim: Gilbert C. Gloeckl, Death Claim No. 77-0300-D.
Robert J. Amelio, Dillman, Sheerer & Schuchert, for petitioner.
Sally A. Lied, Deputy Attorney General, with her, Edward G. Biester, Jr., Attorney General, for respondent.
President Judge Crumlish and Judges Rogers and Blatt, sitting as a panel of three. Opinion by President Judge Crumlish.
Barbara J. Gloeckl appeals a decision of the Pennsylvania Crime Victim's Compensation Board (Board) that she is not eligible for compensation under Section 477 of the Administrative Code of 1929 (Code).*fn1 The Board ruled that her receipt of $309,596.88 in insurance proceeds made her ineligible under Section 477.9(e) of the Act, 71 P.S. § 180-7.9(e). Affirmed.
Mrs. Gloeckl's husband was shot and killed when he was making a night deposit for his employer, Hills Department Store, of Aliquippa, Pennsylvania. As a result of her husband's death, the Board calculated Mrs. Gloeckl's loss of support at $240,311.39; however, at the same time she was to receive $309,596.88 in insurance proceeds to compensate her for those losses. By applying Section 477.9(e) of the Act, which provides
[a]ny award made pursuant to this act shall be reduced by the amount of any payments received or to be received by the claimant as a result of the injury (i) from or on behalf of the person who committed the crime, (ii) under any insurance programs including those mandated by law, (iii) under any contract of insurance wherein the claimant is the insured beneficiary, (iv) from public funds, or (v) as an emergency award pursuant to section 477.8 of this act. 71 P.S. § 180-7.9(e). (Emphasis added.)
to the facts on hand, the Board declared Mrs. Gloeckl ineligible for compensation.
Mrs. Gloeckl first argues that since Section 477.9(e) does not address itself to the death of a crime victim, the statutory set-off provisions are inapplicable. We must disagree.
This Court recently decided that the statutory language, "injury," as appearing in the Act shall also mean death. See Turner Appeal, 44 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 326, 403 A.2d 1346 (1979). As Judge Blatt pointed out, reference only to "injury" in the Act reflected merely a lack of symmetry and precision in drafting rather than an intent to exclude the physical condition of death. Id. at 332, 403 A.2d at 1349.
Having decided that the Board properly applied the set-off provisions of Section 477.9(e) of the Act, we now turn to ...