The Fifth Circuit also found support for its holding in the legislative history. Section 1014, as mentioned earlier, represents a consolidation of 13 other sections with similar provisions, which occurred in 1948. The court observed that most of these sections involved federal agencies making loans for farming or home construction, but two did not: those protecting Federal Reserve banks and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Id. at 1219. From 1949 through 1970, other entities were added, the most notable being the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, FDIC-insured banks, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, FSLIC-insured institutions, members of the Home Loan Bank System, and the Administrator for the National Credit Union Administration.
The court noted that
"[t]hus, by 1970 the codified section was not devoted exclusively to criminal coverage for false applications in the farming and home construction field....
This development leads us to the inference, contrary to the court's conclusions in Edwards, that the intent of Congress was to incorporate in one codal section all of the business transactions of any of the specified agencies. The statute therefore proscribes not only fraudulent statements given in connection with farm or construction loan [sic] but 'all undertaking[s] which might subject the FDIC insured bank to risk to loss.' United States v. Stoddart, 10 Cir. 1978, 574 F.2d 1050, 1053."
The Third Circuit has not yet considered the question before us. We therefore may look to cases from other jurisdictions for guidance.
The logic of the Fifth Circuit's analysis of § 1014 in Payne is certainly persuasive, but we cannot ignore § 1014's bare language, which is ambiguous with respect to the cashing of checks. Criminal statutes are to be strictly construed, and ambiguities resolved in the defendant's favor. United States v. Ortega, 517 F.2d 1006, 1009 (3d Cir. 1975). We agree with the Edwards court that if Congress had intended to protect the institutions enumerated in § 1014 from check-kiting schemes, it would have done so explicitly.
Of course, the rule that ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity is not to be used in complete disregard of the purpose of the legislature. Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 577 (1977). But the legislative history of § 1014 of scant, and we find nothing in it indicating that § 1014 was meant to include check-kiting in its prohibition. For example, the conference report accompanying the legislation which added FDIC-insured institutions and credit unions insured by the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund to § 1014's protection states:
"The House bill contained a provision not in the senate amendment providing criminal penalties for making false statements or reports in connection with loans or other similar transactions involving an insured savings and loan association. The conference substitute contains the House provision with an amendment applying the same penalties to financial institutions insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and credit unions insured by the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund."
Conf. Rep. No. 91-1784, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in  U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5582, 5683-84 (emphasis added).
Similarly the legislative history of the 1964 amendment of § 1014, adding federal credit unions, states that the amendment
"would make it an offense under the United States Criminal Code for anyone knowingly to make a false statement or report or willfully overvalue any land, property, or security to influence the action of a Federal credit union in connection with any application, loan, or the like."
S. Rep. No. 1078, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in  U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2519, 2520 (emphasis added).
The strongest evidence that § 1014 does not cover transactions outside of the borrowing and lending context appears at id. at 2522:
"Section 1014 is designed primarily to apply to borrowers from Federal agencies or federally chartered organizations. It is not, however, limited by its terms to borrowers and would seem also to apply to others, including for example, officers and employees of the agencies and institutions named."
We conclude from the above that there is no expressed Congressional intent to include check-kiting as criminal activity under § 1014. As we said, the Payne court's reasoning is persuasive. But we believe that when the Government's interpretation of a criminal statute is not readily ascertainable from a reading of the statute, it is the better course not to broaden its application beyond that which its context signifies.
We therefore grant the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment.
An order follows.
AND NOW, January 9th, 1981, the Motion to Dismiss the Indictment is granted.