by unsupported findings of fact or erroneous legal analysis. It would be anomalous if, under a federal statute which contemplated recourse to the federal courts to examine state administrative decisions alleged not to fulfill the promise of a federally funded program, a deficient state administrative procedure could preclude review, especially when the gravamen of the complaint is precisely that deficiency. Even a legal mind, adept as it may be at ignoring the inexorable consequences of its premises, would be hard to put to persuade itself (let alone others) that the Act's guarantee of a free appropriate education would be served by such reasoning.
So it is that I conclude that section 1415(e)(2) not only provides for a kind of appellate jurisdiction, but also for review whenever the plaintiff, having exhausted all applicable administrative remedies, remains "aggrieved."
D. Immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's Department of Education has asked that it be dismissed as a party defendant on the basis of its Eleventh Amendment immunity. This motion must be granted unless there is some clear abrogation of that immunity by Congress. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456, 96 S. Ct. 2666, 2671, 49 L. Ed. 2d 614 (1976); Savage v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al., 475 F. Supp. 524 (E.D.Pa.1979). The Civil Rights Act apparently does not work such an abrogation, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 99 S. Ct. 1139, 1146, 59 L. Ed. 2d 358 (1979), nor have plaintiffs proffered anything suggesting that the other statutes relied on do. The fact that compensatory damages may be available to plaintiffs under 20 U.S.C. § 1415, see Boxall v. Sequoia Union High School District, 464 F. Supp. 1104, 1112 (N.D.Cal.1979), does not argue in favor of abrogating Eleventh Amendment immunity, but rather the opposite. Stubbs v. Kline, 463 F. Supp. 110, 114-15 (W.D.Pa.1978). Hence, the Department of Education's motion will be granted.
Robert Scanlon, the Secretary of the Department of Education, has also asked that he be dismissed on the same grounds. The recovery here, if any, will not in fact be against Secretary Scanlon, but his agency; the Secretary is but a nominal defendant here, and nothing in the amended complaint supports an inference that the Secretary is being sued in his individual capacity.
Hence, I will grant his motion. Cf. Stubbs, supra at 114-15; West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158, 163 (3d Cir. 1978).
E. The Specificity of Pleading.
Superintendent Michael Marcase asks that he be dismissed from the civil rights portion of the complaint because his alleged behavior is not pleaded with sufficient specificity. See generally, Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 923 (3d Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. Smith v. Robinson, 495 F. Supp. 696, 698-99 (E.D.Pa.1980). The allegations currently are little more than a recital of his official position at the time of Lester Hark's placement problems, together with an allegation that the Superintendent did nothing to satisfy the plaintiffs' claims. There is no suggestion that the Superintendent either knew of Lester Hark's predicament, or, knowing, had it within his power to ameliorate it.
The plaintiffs have replied to the Superintendent's motion by suggesting that discovery is required to determine the Superintendent's role. The suggestion that discovery will enable plaintiffs to draft their complaint properly is insufficient to meet the applicable standards of specificity in this Circuit, cf. Krier v. Amodio, 441 F. Supp. 181, 183 (E.D.Pa.1977), or, indeed, the logical prohibition against circular reasoning. Thus, the Superintendent's motion to be dismissed as a party defendant in the §§ 1981 and 1983 action will be granted.