The opinion of the court was delivered by: MARSH
On July 29, 1980, at a pretrial conference in the above-captioned case involving a motor vehicle accident, we stated on the record as follows: "... it is the ruling of the Court that no fault will not enter into this case." This ruling was made following an examination of Mr. Szanca, the plaintiff, under oath.
We further ruled that the "(plaintiff) can introduce any evidence of his medical expenses as in any other common law of Pennsylvania trial. And he cannot only introduce evidence of his medical expenses, but his pain, suffering and inconvenience and his loss of earning power, loss of earning capacity, if he can prove it, and his wife can prove loss of consortium."
Accordingly, the case went to trial with plaintiff being permitted to prove lost wages and medical expenses and a special verdict was submitted to the jury on the amount of medical expenses, lost wages, pain, suffering and inconvenience, loss of earning capacity without a present worth instruction pursuant to Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 491 Pa. 561, 421 A.2d 1027 (1980), and the plaintiff wife's loss of consortium.
We are now of the opinion that the special verdict rendered by the jury in this matter should be molded to conform with the provisions of the Pennsylvania No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, 40 Pa.C.S.A. § 1009.101 et seq. and the Statute covering employees of the State Police Force at 53 P.S. § 637 et seq. Accordingly, an appropriate order has been entered in favor of Eugene Szanca in the sum of $ 10,000.00 and in favor of Linda Szanca in the sum of $ 2,500.00. This amended judgment order does not include medical expenses in the sum of $ 1,746.25 and lost wages in the sum of $ 2,478.00 which were awarded to plaintiffs by answers one and two of the special verdict.
It is our present opinion that the No-Fault Act applies to an obligated government such as the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Section 104(a) of the Act
entitled "Required motor vehicle insurance" provides that the owner of a motor vehicle may provide security ... "as an obligated government." There is no question that pursuant to the definitions under Section 103 of the Act,
the government, i. e., the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, is an obligated government. The Commonwealth also meets the requirement of being an "owner" under the Act.
states that "(a) government may provide security with respect to any motor vehicle owned or operated by it by lawfully obligating itself to pay basic restoration benefits in accordance with this act and such added restoration benefits as are specified in the undertaking."
It seems certain that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is an obligated government under the statute contained in 53 P.S. § 637 dealing with plaintiff husband's occupation as a state policeman.
Said statute, in pertinent part provides:
It is our conclusion that in light of the foregoing, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is an "obligated government" within the meaning of the Pennsylvania No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act. See: Maxwell v. Allstate Insurance Co., 128 P.L.J. 11 (C.P. Court Allegheny County 1979).
As stated by Chief Judge Weber in Phelps v. Red Star Express Lines, 460 F. Supp. 158, 159 (W.D.Pa.1978):
"We are equally mindful, however, that the No-Fault Motor Vehicle Act strictly limits tort liability, to-wit:
"(a) Partial abolition. Tort liability is abolished with respect to any injury that takes place in ...