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September 29, 1980


The opinion of the court was delivered by: BECKER



 (Admissibility of Materials Relating to Activities in Japan)

 I. Preliminary Statement

 This is the second in a series of opinions which will address the myriad issues raised during the course of a lengthy pretrial evidentiary hearing in this complex antitrust case. The anatomy and scope of the case has been described in our opinion on subject matter jurisdiction, filed April 14, 1980. The nature and scope of the evidentiary hearing has been described in the first opinion in the current series, filed on August 7, 1980. 1/ This opinion will consider admissibility of three major groups of documents: (1) materials seized by the Japanese Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) in "raids" on the offices of several of the defendants here who were respondents in the so-called "Six Company Case"; 2/ (2) testimony and statedments or "protocols" given by officials of the respondent companies during the course of the JFTC proceedings in the "Six Company Case"; and (3) materials produced in discovery from the files of the Japanese defendants and others relating to activities in Japan of Japanese manufacturers of consumer electronic products or of associations of manufacturers. There were virtually no documents in these categories whose admissibility was agreed upon, and all of the documents were the subject of heated dispute about their admissibility.

 In the course of the pretrial evidentiary hearing, we also considered the admissibility of a host of materials produced in discovery from the files of defendants and of American purchasers of Japanese-made consumer electronic products relating to certain import transactions. We do not rule on the admissibility of any of those documents in this opinion. However, the legal questions involved in determining the admissibility of the import-related documents are essentially the same as those considered herein. 3/ As a result, the legal rulings in Part II, infra, will relate as well to the import transaction documents. To the extent that rulings on the admissibility of particular import-related documents are necessary, we will make them in our forthcoming opinion deciding the defendants' motion for summary judgfment on proof of conspiracy.

 Before we proceed further, some explanation is in order as to our reasons for writing a long opinion about admissibility of the documents relating to activities in Japan, while reserving admissibility rulings relative to import related documents. When we first addressed defendants' summary judgment motions in April 1979, we were compelled to postpone consideration of those motions addressing plaintiffs' conspiracy claims because of the amorphous state of the record. At that time plaintiffs were invoking in support of these claims not only the entire JFTC record of some 6300 pages, but also an unlimited number of documents from among the millions of documents produced for inspection during discovery. It was clear to all concerned that out of this huge record there were a limited, though yet unidentified, number of critical documents whose admissibility it was important to determine and that, at all events, it was impossible for us to decide the summary judgment motions in the absence of a more discrete record. We concluded that what was first required was the filing of plaintiffs' Federal Pretrial Statement (F.P.S.), with preclusive effect. 4/ We later decided that a second step was necessary -- the holding of pretrial evidentiary hearings at which we could focus clearly on plaintiffs' key documents and also rule on admissibility since summary judgment motions are to be determined on the basis of admissible evidence. See Rule 56(e).

 Even before the F.P.S. was filed, the emanations from the JFTC proceedings pervaded the case. During the course of many pretrial conferences, and in the initial summary judgment briefs, we were constantly confronted with plaintiffs' allegations that the documents seized by the JFTC during the course of the Six Company Case were laden with evidence of conspiratorial activities by the defendants, in both the domestic Japanes and the export matters. The most frequently cited sources were the three diaries of Seiichi Yajima, an official of Toshiba Corp. The significance of Yajima's diaries was underscored when the F.P.S. was finally filed, for it contained no less than 600 references to them.

 The F.p.s./ was similarly suffused with references to other documents which had their source in the JFTC proceedings, many of which were likewise represented as demonstrating the existence of a broad based unitary conspiracy to destroy the American consumer electronic products industry by a low price predatory export conspiracy funded or "war-chested" by conspiratorial high prices in Japan. Because of the extremely broad and allegedly damning implications of the JFTC material as portrayed in the F.P.S., it became evident to us that the intensive scrutiny of all of the critical documents was a condition precedent to any full and fair decision on the summary judgment motions.

 On the other hand, the references to import-related documents were, generally, more limited in character. What is reflected in most of the import related documents is a practice on the part of the Japanese manufacturers to give rebates to the American importers. These rebates had the effect of reducing the actual price paid by importers below the "check-price" divulged to American customs authorities and to the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). The existence of the rebate practice is not disputed by most of the defendants (although they do dispute plaintiffs' allegations of customs fraud). While the plaintiffs contend (and defendants deny) that a variety of inferences may be drawn from these documents that point to concerted activity by defendants and their co-conspirators in furtherance of a predatory export scheme, the important point here is that the fact of the rebate payments is not generally in issue. As a result, the admissibility vel non of most of these documents is not significant for the Rule 56 motion.

 We will thus consider - and at some length because of its importance - the admissibility of Mr. Yajima's diary. Also to be considered at some length, because they are alleged to be of similarly great import are the diaries of Messrs. Yamamoto and Yamada, both employees of Hitachi; Mr. Okuma, an employee of MELCO, and Mr. Tokizane, an employee of Matsushita. During the course of the Six Company Case proceedings, Mr. Yajima and a number of other officials of Japanese companies were interviewed and gave statements, referred to herein as "protocols." They also gave formal testimony at hearings before the JETC. In plaintiffs' submission, the protocols and testimony contain significant evidence of conspiratorial activity by defendants, and also authenticate the diaries under Federal Rule of Evidence 901 and qualify them as business records within the meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6). 5/ These matters will also be treated at length, as will certain of the materials produced in discovery relating to the activities in Japan of Japanese manufacturers or manufacturers associations.

 Textually, the protocols, testimony and other writings indicate that there were meetings of Japanese consumer electronics products executives, and that at those meetings they discussed predictions of domestic demand, the establishment of domestic "bottom prices," i.e. minimum suggested retail sales prices, and appropriate domestic wholesale profit, retail profit, and "rebate" margins in the retail distribution chain. There are scattered references in the documents to "export," though, for the most part, the executives attending the meetings had no responsibility for export matters.

 The protocols, which were prepared by JFTC investigators and signed by the witnesses, are straightforward, readily comprehensible, narrative statements. The testimony is similarly clear, and is developed through question and answer in a manner which is generally similar to that employed to develop testimony in the U.S. legal system. 6/ The diaries and memoranda are another matter. The diaries all appeal to have been written solely for the diarist, with the notations written in a kind of shorthand or code which the writer presumably himself can understand, but which no one else could fully understand except for occasional excerpts. As defendants correctly note, they are a "hodge podge" of notes in which the author has not explained with any degree of clarity what he meant, to what he was referring, or even where he was when he wrote it. While plaintiffs have clarified a few of the references in the diaries by cross reference to JFTC testimony or protocols, only an infinitesimal part has been thus explained. One would have to engage in the rankest of speculation to make sense out of the vast bulk of the diaries.

 One cannot tell with any certainty where entries begin and end. There are many time gaps in the notebooks or diaries, and only a portion of the "conspiratorial meetings" otherwise demonstrated to have taken place are recorded in them. There are all kinds of arrows and innumerable symbols and notations and references which are unintelligible to the translators, who report those references as "illegible." Many of them are written in a code which only a cryptographer could solve.

 There is both intrinsic and extrinsic evidence that many of the diary entries reflect occurrences at meetings which the diarists did not attend, but rather about which they were informed by others. The diaries plainly contain numerous instances of second and third level hearsay. Because of the manner in which the diaries are kept, however, it is not possible to sort out which entries are based upon the diarist's personal knowledge and which are based upon hearsay. There is no evidence of regular or continuous habit on the part of any of the diarists in making their notebook entries or checking them systematically. There is no evidence that the diaries were ever communicated (or intended to be communicated) to anyone else. Given this general description, it is obvious that the admissibility of the diaries would be in sharp dispute.

 The evidentiary hearings focused only upon the important documents in the case. Some, including the diaries, were considered in enormous depth, in argument lasting hour after hour. During the course of argument, plaintiffs would advance many reasons why the particular document was authenticated, why it was a business record or an admission or a statement against interest, and so forth, referencing a host of matters in the voluminous record. The defendants would respond, and all would join in extensive colloquy with the court on each point.

 Unlike our procedure in connection with the public records and reports, we did not address at the hearings matters of relevancy and its limits (F.R.E. Article IV). There are serious relevancy issues with respect to many of these documents; however, with one exception, we will defer relevancy considerations, including those under Rule 403, until our opinion on the summary judgment conspiracy motions. 7/ We also defer until then the determination as to whether the plaintiffs have produced evidence aliunde of a conspiracy which would render their evidence admissible against coconspirators under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). 8/

 The admissibility of the referenced JFTC materials has been fought on a number of battlegrounds. First, the defendants have challenged the authenticity of much of the proffered material, asserting that the plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of establishing authentication under F.R.E. 901 and 902. Defendants urge that the notion of authentication does not implicate merely the genuineness of the subject document, but also involves additional layers of foundation. In order for a diary to be authenticated within the meaning of Rule 901, for example, defendants argue that plaintiffs must not only establish its genuineness, but also, to the extent that it is proffered as a faithful account of what transpired at meetings attended by the diarist, must establish personal knowledge by the diarist of the recorded events.

 The remaining disputed issues relate to Article VIII of the FRE, the hearsay rules. The principal hearsay objection is defendant's contention that none of the diaries or memoranda are records of regularly conducted activity within F.R.E. 803(6), the "business records" exception to the hearsay rule. This contention is advanced in four aspects: (1) that plaintiffs have failed to qualify the materials as business records by the testimony of a "custodian or other qualified witness" as required by 803(6); (2) the documents to not meet the requirement that they were kept in the regular course of business and that it was the regular practice of the business to make the record; and (3) the plaintiffs have failed to establish the "personal knowledge" required under 803(6); and (4) the materials are untrustworthy. Defendants characterize the diaries and memoranda as an unintelligible hodge podge of materials which inherently cannot qualify as business records, especially in the absence of a witness to explain them. Plaintiffs rejoin that a "custodian or other qualified witness" is not necessary and that they have adequately qualified the documents through circumstantial means, including analysis of the documents themselves, cross-validation by way of comparison with other documents, and the fact of production of the documents by defendants under F.R.Civ.P. 33(c) or 34. 9/

 Alternatively, the plaintiffs seek admissibility of some of the diaries and memoranda under F.R.E. 801(d)(2) (B)(C)&(D) as admissions against the company which employed the declarant.In each such instance, defendants object that the requisite foundation has not been laid on the grounds that the requirements of subsections (B)(C)&(D) have not been met. Moreover, admission of the diaries is resisted on the grounds that in each case they were not communicated to anyone within or outside the company hence do not qualify under the rules for authorized or vicarious admissions. Defendants also argue that the diaries do not constitute "assertions" within the meaning of Rule 801(a), hence cannot be admissions, and that they cannot in any event qualify as admissions because they are rambling, conjectural and suppositous statements, rather than specific, clear, and concise ones.

 Plaintiffs also seek admission of the diaries and memoranda under Rule 803(1), as present sense impressions, under Rule 803(5) as recorded recollection, and under 803(24) and 804(b)(5), the residual or "catchall" exceptions, on the grounds of their supposed truthworthiness. They apparently also assert them to be statements against interest under 804(b)(3). The defendants deny the applicability of 803(1) and 804(b)(3) to the diaries for a variety of reasons, substantive and foundational. Defendants also argue that the foundational requirements of the residual exceptions are not met (or have been waived) because of plaintiffs' failure to try to secure equally or more probative evidence by other reasonable means (i.e. depositions of the diarists and memo writers). They further assert that the materials lack the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness required by 803(24) and 804(b)(5). Finally, they argue that the residual exceptions are not intended to be available in situations otherwise provided for by the rules, an argument which they dub the "near miss" doctrine. 10/

 The protocols are said by plaintiffs to be admissible as statements against interest under F.R.E. 804(b)(3), under the residual exceptions, and as admissions of a party opponent under 801(d)(2)(C) and (D).Plaintiffs' reliance on F.R.E. 804(b)(3) requires a showing under 804(a) of unavailability of the declarant. While there is no dispute as to Mr. Yajima's unavailability, since he died in 1968, defendants strongly contend that all of the other declarants are available because, under 804(a)(5), their attendance or testimony could easily have been procured. More specifically, defendants represent that virtually all of the diarists and persons who attended the alleged conspiratorial meetings are alive and well and still employed by their respective companies and that they have been available for discovery or trial depositions for years.

 Defendants also contend that the requirements of 804(b)(3) are not met because the statements and testimony given in the JFTC proceeding were not against the pecuniary or proprietary interest of any witness whose statement of testimony is proffered, much less "so far" contrary to his interest, or "so far" subjecting him to civil or criminal liability that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true, the requirement of Rule 804(b)(3).They also assert that plaintiffs have advanced no evidence of consciousness of contrariety to interest, another requirement of 804(b)(3). Defendants add that even if the witnesses' statements tended to subject their employers to civil or criminal liability, the posture of the employers does not matter for Rule 804(b)(3) purposes.

 Defendants argue that neither the protocols nor the testimony are admissions because the persons making them were neither authorized to make a statement concerning the subject, nor were the statements made concerning a matter within the scope of their agency or employment. Finally, defendants oppose the notion that the residual hearsay exceptions are available in these circumstances. First they invoke the so-called "near miss" doctrine under which the residual exception cannot be invoked if the proffered hearsay fits within the framework but fails to qualify under a specific hearsay exception. Second, they challenge the trustworthiness of these materials. Third, they assert that more probative evidence could be procured by reasonable efforts.

 In connection with each of our determinations, whether under the authentication rules or the hearsay rules, we must determine whether admissible evidence is required to support the factual findings which are the underpinnings of the ruling on the admissibility of the evidence proffered. Rule 104(a) provides that in making determinations of preliminary questions concerning the admissibility of evidence, the court is not bound by the Rules of Evidence, except with respect to privileges. Under Rule 104(b), entitled "Conditional Relevancy," however, the jury rather than the court makes the ultimate determination of admissibility, hence admissible evidence is required. The parties dispute the need for admissible evidence in the qualification process not just in connection with authentication, but also at the subsequent levels, e.g. qualification as a business record. The plaintiffs argue that admissible evidence is not required in the qualification process, relying principally on 104(a), while the defendants maintain that it is. 11/

 The foregoing is a catalog of the more significant legal questions which have arisen during the course of our hearings over the JFTC and cognate materials. As we have noted, similar questions have arisen in connection with the materials produced in discovery in connection with import transactions.Still other interesting legal questions have arisen which we shall enumerate as we proceed through our discussion. Because virtually all of these questions have been raised with respect to each document, the discussion of each will perforce be many layered, though we hope not labyrinthine.

 We have observed about the diaries the difficulty that anyone other than the diarist would have in understanding them. It is of course obvious that there are indeed persons who could eliminate that difficulty and decipher any codelike references in any diary: either the diarist himself, or, in his absence, someone present at the meeting whose proceedings are supposedly recorded in the diary, or someone contemporaneously familiar with the content of the diary or memo and the diarist's recording practices. However, the plaintiffs, despite their role as proponents of the documents hence bearers of the burden to qualify them, have not proffered the testimony in any form of any such person. Moreover, they have made it clear that they have no intention of doing so, before or at trial. Rather, they prefer to qualify the documents circumstantially and to offer selected (though voluminous) excerpts therefrom in connection with the summary judgment motions and at trial.

 The litigation strategy we have described is not our supposition, but rather the plaintiff's clear statedment. Edwin P. Rome, Esquire, plaintiffs' lead counsel, has confirmed the strategy again and again. For instance, he noted during the course of the evidentiary hearings:

 I assume personally, Your Honor, whatever onus there may be about the fact that we chose quite deliberately, and I state it of record, we chose quite deliberately not to undertake to depose persons in a foreign language when we had documents that in our view documented and explicated a conspiracy to violate American law.

 PTO 268 at 143-44 (June 27, 1980). There are numerous similar statements by Mr. Rome in the voluminous pretrial record in this case. 12/

 This litigation strategy was maintained in the face of repeated warning from the defendants that they intended to challenge the admissibility of the diaries, memoranda, protocols, and testimony. This warning came not only during the course of our numerous pretrial conferences, but even in Melco's motion for summary judgment, filed April 1978, well before the close of discovery. In that motion, Melco spent many pages detailing the kinds of evidentiary foundational deficiencies we deal with herein. Yet the plaintiffs, all the while insisting they were ready for trial, declined to take depositions of those who might shed light upon the documents. For example, at the pretrial conference of June 14, 1978, six months before the close of plaintiffs' discovery period, plaintiffs' counsel stated to the Court:

 MR. McELROY: We said a long time ago, and Ed Rome has repeated throughout, that the plaintiffs in this case are ready to go to trial upon reasonable advance notice. We believe that discovery in the case to date is sufficient for us to get to a jury and to get a verdict. Likewise, we believe that, and it follows, that we believe we have had enough discovery, we have enough evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment. We don't need further discovery in order to respond to [Melco's counsel] Mr. Reath's motion.

 PTO 107, at 21.

 Indeed, the plaintiffs were challenged on several occasions by the Court as to why, having proceeded with this case for close to a decade, and having inspected literally millions of documents, they had failed to take depositions for the purpose of laying foundation for the admissibility of the challenged JFTC materials *fn13" It was pointed out that such foundational depositions are regular fare in complex cases, i.e. it is the custom for counsel to take them. *fn14" Mr. Rome consistently responded that it was his considered decision not to do so. The plaintiffs did take depositions of some Japanese executives in connection with the motions relative to personal jurisdiction and venue. n15/ That foundational (or substantive) depositions of Japanese executives were feasible is demonstrated by the repeated and uncontroverted representations of defense counsel that, with the exception of Mr. Yajima who died in 1968, all of the diarists and all persons whose names were focused upon during the evidentiary hearings are alive and well in Japan, still employed by their companies, and that they have been available for depositions for many years.

 It is important to note that our observations about plaintiffs' strategy are not merely retrospective, for it is clear that plaintiffs intend to call no witnesses from Japan to lay foundation for admissibility at trial either. Not only have they so conceded, but had they intended to do so they would have been obliged to list those witnesses in their preclusive F.P.S., which they have not done.

 The defendants' explanation for plaintiffs' litigation strategy is not gentle. They state it in their "Memorandum of Certain Defendants in Support of their Position that Materials from the JFTC Proceeding Are Not Admissible in Evidence" (pp. 3-4) as follows:

 Indeed, it seems clear that it was precisely because the Japanese materials do not constitute records of the only two matters that could make them properly probative in this case, that plaintiffs chose not to follow the normal route of taking depositions to lay a proper foundation for their introduction. Plaintiffs knew that such depositions would not be helpful to their case and that, at the end of such discovery, while they might have come up with admissible evidence regarding discussions of "bottom prices" by six companies for two years (1965-1966), they would not come up with any admissible evidence of the creation of a U.S. export invasion fund or of a United States predatory price agreement. They, therefore, seized upon the ploy of attempting to introduce the materials without proper foundations -- and without any opportunity by the other side to cross examine -- and arguing to the jury that all kinds of wild inferences can be drawn from a handful of cryptic and basically incomprehensible "export references" found in materials which were obviously not written to record export activities. Since plaintiffs' direct case will last for some months, the jury will be hopelessly prejudiced by such tactics before the first of the defendants could even be heard.

 In furtherance of this approach, plaintiffs adopted the tactic of piling into the FPS hundreds of thousands of materials and spuriously arguing that they are all evidence of conspiracy, so that they could create the argument that it would be extremely burdensome for them to lay foundations in the normal way, even though their PPTM and summary judgment briefs show that they are, in fact, relying on a relatively small number of such Japanese materials.

 Defendants conclude with a little homily:

 Fortunately, as we will demonstrate below, our Rules and evidentiary precedents, which are rooted in basic fairness and due process, do not allow for such a result. Evidence must be shown -- through the establishment of a foundation in prescribed ways -- to be proper and reliable before it can be thrown before a jury and begin to affect that jury's mind.

 Of course, the legal aspect of their homily is quite correctly stated. And while we do not endorse defendants' rhetoric, we do note that we find a kernel of truth in defendants' evaluation of plaintiffs' litigation strategy.

 The volume of material before us for consideration is staggering. We refer not only to the large number of documents (and the large volume of document pages), but also the extensive briefs and other submissions of the parties. It was represented to us during the hearings that, at that juncture, some 85 or more lawyers and paralegals were working close to full time on the case (75 for the defendants). Scores of memoranda relating to admissibility were filed during the hearings, and it is difficult to digest all of that material so as to write a worthy opinion. We shall do our best.

 Because the plaintiffs have not produced the conventional evidentiary foundation, i.e. testimony of a custodian or other qualified witness, it is necessary that we evaluate the subject documents on the basis of the circumstantial factors called to our attention by plaintiffs' counsel at our evidentiary hearings. Doing so will be a tedious process, requiring us, in the case of each document, to review plaintiffs' foundation and defendants' response and then to apply the applicable legal standards to determine admissibility. We are aided materially in this regard by the post-hearing submissions of the parties which summarize the plaintiffs' foundation and defendants' response on each document, and we draw heavily upon those submissions. After a point there will be some degree of repetition in the factual patterns, enabling us to simply incorporate earlier discussion by reference. However, because of the importance plaintiffs attributed to each of the critical documents taken up in this opinion, we cannot, in fairness, unduly truncate or abbreviate our description of plaintiffs' foundational proffer or defendants' response. All of this makes for a very long opinion for which we apologize but which we cannot avoid. This is because of our obligation to the parties in this very important case to which they have devoted so much time and expense, and also to the Court of Appeals which will ultimately review it and will need a full statement of the reasons for our major rulings.

 For the variety of reasons which follow, we conclude that neither the diaries, memoranda or "minutes of meetings" nor discrete portions thereof are admissible in evidence; that the JFTC testimony is admissible against the defendants in the Six Company Case only, except for any so-called "export" and war-chesting "references," which are, with minor exceptions, inadmissible; and that the protocols are admissible against the employer of the maker of the protocol.

 In terms of opinion structure, we shall follow the same course here as we did in the first opinion in this series. In Part II, we shall set out the legal principles applicable to the evidentiary questions we must decide, resolving the disputes between plaintiffs and defendants on legal issues. We shall take up all of the sections of the F.R.E. claimed by the parties to have bearing upon whether any of the documents were authenticated or admissible under one of the exceptions to the hearsay rules. As will be seen, there is hardly a section or subsection of Article VIII (hearsay) or Article IX (authentication) of the F.R.E. that escaped their advocacy. The number of rules invoked is largely a function of plaintiffs' circumstantial mode of laying foundation, as opposed to doing so by direct testimony. Because of these myriad issues and the fact that some of them are of first impression, this discussion will be extremely detailed. Then, in Part III, we shall describe the documents at issue and then apply the legal principles to the documents, determining their admissibility vel non. Fortunately, the breadth of the Part II discussion will cut "across the board" and will obviate the necessity for further legal discussion in Part III.

 II. Rulings on Contested Legal Issues Concerning Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence

 A. Authentication

 The requirements for authenticating documents are set forth in Article IX of the F.R.E. The general provisions of Rule 901(a) provide:

 The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.

 1. The Standard for a Preliminary Ruling on Authentication Under Rule 104; Will Inadmissible Evidence Suffice?

 (a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.

 (b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition...

 (e) Weight and credibility. This rule does not limit the right of a party to introduce before the jury evidence relevant to weight or credibility.

 The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 104(b) makes plain that preliminary questions of conditional relevancy are not determined solely by the judge, for to do so would greatly restrict the function of the jury as the trier of fact. If, for instance, there were serious questions in this case as to whether Mr. Yajima's diary was a forgery, it is obvious that a question of evidence so critical could not be decided solely by the court.Under the aegis of Rule 104(b), the judge makes a preliminary determination whether the foundation evidence is sufficient to permit a factfinder conclude that the condition in question has been fulfilled.If so, according to the Advisory Committee Note:

 ... the item is admitted. If after all of the evidence on the issue is in, pro and con, the jury could reasonably conclude that fulfillment of the condition is not established the issue is for them. If the evidence is not such as to allow a finding, the judge withdraws the matter from their consideration.

 In United States v. Goichman, 547 F.2d 778, 784 (3d Cir. 1976), the Court of Appeals formulated this principle as follows:

 [The] showing of authenticity is not on a par with more technical evidentiary rules, such as hearsay exceptions, governing admissibility. Rather, there need be only a prima facie showing, to the court, of authenticity, not a full argument on admissibility.

 Thus, once a prima facie showing has been made to the court that a document is what its proponent claims, it should be admitted. At that point the burden of going forward with respect to authentication shifts to the opponent to rebut the prima facie showing by presenting evidence to the trier of fact which would raise questions as to the genuineness of the document. *fn16" The required prima facie showing of authentication need not consist of a preponderance of the evidence. Rather, all that is required is substantial evidence from which the trier of fact might conclude that a document is authentic. As the court in Goichman, supra, stated:

 [It] is the jury who will ultimately determine the authenticity of the evidence, not the court. The only requirement is that there has been substantial evidence from which they could infer that the document was authentic.

 Id. (emphasis added). *fn17"

 The plaintiffs contend that in determining whether an adequate prima facie showing has been made, the court may consider inadmissible evidence. We disagree. Under Rule 104(b), authentication must be established by the "introduction of evidence." By using this language, the Rule plainly contemplates that the jury's determination of authenticity will be made only on the basis of admissible evidence. We find nothing in either Rule 104 or the Advisory Committee notes to suggest that the jury may consider inadmissible evidence in this regard, except to the extent that evidence may be admitted "subject to" the introduction of subsequent (admissible) evidence of its authenticity.

 So then, while the court's power to "consider" inadmissible evidence under Rule 104(a) is clear, the substantive determination which the court is required to make on the issue of authentication is whether admissible evidence exists which is sufficient to support a jury finding of authenticity. For it would be a pointless exercise for a judge to rely upon inadmissible evidence to fulfill the substantial evidence requirement when the trier of fact can only consider admissible evidence that a proffered document is authentic. *fn18" Accordingly, we hold that under Rule 104(a), Rule 104(b), and Goichman, our task in ruling on authenticity is limited to determining whether there is substantial admissible evidence to support a finding of authentication by the trier of fact. *fn19"

 Since only admissible evidence can form the basis for the determination of authentication, the degree to which plaintiffs rely on using some of the documents they have submitted to authenticate other documents creates problems of circularity, and in some cases it is more logical to determine other aspects of admissibility before reaching the 901 determination. This will be considered infra with regard to specific categories of documents.

 2.The Notion of Authentication and the Scope of Rule 901(a); is Authenticity More Than Mere Genuineness?

 Another important issue addressed in argument and briefs is the intended scope of Rule 901(a) and, in particular, the meaning of the last phrase which defines authentication as a finding "that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." In contrast to the position of the plaintiffs, who equate authentication with genuineness, the defendants contend that the scope of authentication is determined by the claims made by the proponent of a document and encompasses all of what the proponent "must claim it is in order to use it as he wishes to" *fn20" (emphasis in original). They argue that the subject documents' "logical status as evidence, and hence their authenticity, could be established only by showing that they are accurate and reliable accounts..." *fn21" (of the allegedly conspiratorial meetings reported), otherwise "they are not probative" *fn22" and thus not what their proponent claims. Since authentication is but a "special aspect of relevancy," Advisory Committee Note to Rule 901(a), this is an appealing argument. After all, the plaintiffs claim that Yajima's diary should be admitted to portray the agreements made at certain meetings. What does it matter then that the diary is not a forgery, if it is not an accurate and reliable account of what transpired at the meetings Yajima purported to record?

 The problem with defendants' argument is that it reads the language of 901 to subsume nearly all of the issues involved in many cases in which the issue may arise. For example, the proponent claims that many of the documents under consideration here are "business records." As the Advisory Committee Notes to 901 make clear, however, this is a completely separate determination which must be addressed outside the scope of the authentication inquiry. *fn23" While the Advisory Committee Notes state specifically that authentication is an aspect of conditional relevancy, they are also quite clear that it is but one kind of conditional relevancy, *fn24" and does not subsume all of the evidentiary foundation which must be established in order to show that a document is relevant evidence:

 Authentication and identification represent a special aspect of relevancy. Thus a telephone conversation may be irrelevant because on an unrelated topic or because the speaker is not identified. The latter aspect is the one here involved. *fn25"

 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

 The specific illustrations under subsection (b) further support a narrow interpretation of authentication. For example, authentication can be established by expert or non-expert opinion on handwriting, F.R.E. 901(b)(2), a method which would do nothing to establish a document as the "accurate and reliable account" that defendants claim it must be in order to authenticate it.

 While, as defendants urge, different showings are required in accordance with the type of evidence presented, in all of the cases and examples which they have cited authentication involves establishing the origin or authorship of an item, or the connection of an item to a particular individual or party. *fn26" In Rhoads v. Virginia-Florida Corporation, 476 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1973), upon which defendants place their strongest reliance, the authenticity of the drawings at issue had been conceded by the opposing party. The court there pointed out that:

 authentication of the documents merely established their authorship, the proof of some human's "personal connection with a corporal object."

 7 Wigmore on Evidence § 2129, at 564 (3d ed. 1940). 476 F.2d at 85 (emphasis added). The court then proceeded to discuss additional requirements for admissibility and suggested that the drawings must either be "verified" by testimony of a witness, citing 3 Wigmore On Evidence § 790, at 218, or must qualify as an exception to the hearsay rule. *fn27" As we have noted supra, a finding of authentication does not establish admissibility, and any other applicable requirements must also be met.

 We conclude that, notwithstanding the apparent sweep of 901, created by its use of a rather expansive locution, i.e., the prescription that authentication is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is "what its proponent claims," the notion of authentication is a narrow one, akin to the notion of genuineness. The other foundation requirements should not be simply subsumed under the authenticity terminology, but should remain analytically distinct. We find other support for this conclusion. First, the Advisory Committee Note, subdivision (a) provides:

 Also, significant inroads upon the traditional insistence on authentication and identification have been made by accepting as at least prima facie genuine items of the kind treated in Rule 902, infra.

 (emphasis added). Moreover, a review of the annotations under Rule 901 confirms this view, for the cases discussing the Rule, have a similarly limited scope. See S. Saltzburg & K. Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 651-52 (1977) and 245-47 (1980 supp.) [hereinafter cited as "Saltzburg"]. Thus such foundation issues as personal knowledge of the declarant, which defendants urge us to treat as authentication issues, will be dealt with separately under the appropriate rules.

 3. Methods of Authentication

 Rule 901(b) lists several examples of methods of authentication which would meet the requirements of 901(a). *fn28" The Advisory Committee Notes for this subsection state that these examples are not intended to exhaust all the possibilities, "but are meant to guide and suggest, leaving room for growth and development in this area of the law."

 In their endeavors to authenticate the matters before us, the plaintiffs place primary emphasis on 901(b)(4), Distinctive Characteristics. They also assert, however, that the testimony and protocols from the JFTC proceedings may provide evidence of authenticity under 901(b)(1) (Testimony of a Witness with Knowledge), and that since some of the documents fall just short of the age requirements under 901(b)(8) (Ancient Documents), this subsection in conjunction with other circumstances would be sufficient to fulfill the 901(a) requirements. Once authenticity has been established for one document, 901(b)(3) may be used to authenticate other documents of a similar type.

 Rule 903 (Subscribing Witness' Testimony Unnecessary) and the illustrations given under 901(b) make it clear that testimony is not essential to establish authenticity, and, as McCormick states, "authentication by circumstantial evidence is uniformly recognized as permissible." *fn29"

 Elements which tend to establish authenticity may be found both in rule 901 itself, in the Advisory Committee Notes, and in the cases which we will outline in the following discussion. One such element is the source of a particular document, i.e., the method or place of its discovery.

 A. Source of the Document

 Plaintiffs urge that the defendants' production of certain of the documents in answer to interrogatories under Rule 33(c) is itself sufficient to establish them ipso facto as authentic. We disagree with this reading of the Rule. *fn30" Given the breadth of the discovery rules and the broad requirements for production, we feel it would undermine the liberal intent of the those rules to interpret such production as an admission of authenticity in the absence of a specific assertion by the producing party regarding the nature or authorship of the documents produced.

 The production of the documents by the defendants may, however, provide circumstantial evidence of authenticity. McCormick notes that a prima facie showing of authenticity is made by the emergence of a document from public custody. He concludes that, while the circumstances of private custody are too varied to warrant an expansion of the rule in every case, "proof of private custody, together with other circumstances, is frequently strong circumstantial evidence of authenticity." *fn31"

 In Alexander Dawson, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 586 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1978), the Ninth Circuit upheld the decision of an Administrative Law Judge admitting ob application forms even though there had been no testimony regarding who had filled out the particular applications, and no witness could testify to a specific chain of custody. The circumstances surrounding their discovery, *fn32" considered along with their contents *fn33" was held adequate to authenticate the forms. In United States v. Natale, 526 F.2d 1160, 1173 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 950 (1976), a notebook that had been seized during the defendants' arrest for extortion was admitted at trial. The Court of Appeals enumerated among the facts supporting its authenticity: (1) the presence of the defendants at the office where the notebook was discovered; (2) that defendants had held numerous meetings with a witness in that office; and (3) that one of the defendants admitted that the office was his. This, together with evidence supplied by the notebook's contents, see infra, was sufficient to allow its admission into evidence. *fn34" We will follow the Dawson and Natale courts by treating the circumstances of their production as one element of circumstantial evidence which tends to authenticate the documents produced by the defendants.

 b. Characteristics of the Document Itself

 The characteristics of the document itself are also a basis for establishing authentication, Rule 901(b)(4). The last phrase of the rule indicates, however, that characteristics of a document must be considered "in conjunction with circumstances." Although Weinstein states that a document "can be authenticated by its contents alone," it is clear, from the examples used, that he "means in light of surrounding circumstances." P901(b)(4)[01] at 901-46. All of the characteristics mentioned in 901(b)(4) are also subject to the overriding requirement of "distinctiveness" under that example.

 The first characteristic mentioned in 901(b)(4) is "appearance." Weinstein gives as examples of the types of appearance the courts may wish to consider: a postmark, a return address, a letterhead, a signature even where affixed by a rubber stamp, typing or form which corresponds to usual practice. *fn35" The aspect of the document's appearance which is most relevant with respect to the JFTC documents is the fact that many of them are marked with a particular person's name in the form of a "chop," a Japanese seal which contains a stylized rendition of a person's name and is sometimes used in lieu of a signature. During the discussion of authenticity of the so-called MITI statement, *fn36" proffered by defendants, they urged that the "chop" affixed to the document made it the legal equivalent of a signed document. Though this contention was resisted at that time by plaintiffs, we conclude that a "chop" should be given weight equivalent to a signature. We recognize that a "chop," like a signature, may not always be genuine. Furthermore, many people with the same surname may have a common "chop", hence the "chop" does not in every case indicate authorship. The particular use of a "chop" will be considered with respect to the individual document upon which it appears. Many of the import transaction documents also have distinguishing characteristics, particularly letterheads.

 A second characteristic mentioned in 901(b)(4), again subject to the distinctiveness requirement, is the contents, or substance, of the document. Contents have been used to establish authentication in a variety of ways. In United States v. Smith, 609 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1979), hotel records of defendant's registration and charges incurred were introduced. Included in the evidence linking the defendant to the records were independent corroboration of his presence at meetings in the hotel, the use of names used by defendant in signing records, and the use of the address which appeared on defendant's business card. *fn37" In Natale, supra, the court similarly relied upon the corroboration of the contents of the notebook involved by independent evidence. One of the entries referred to a loan made to a witness in the case, and served to authenticate the document.

 In Goichman, supra, 547 F.2d at 783, an unsigned document entitled "History of Children's Assets," which listed the defendants' expenditures, had been produced as part of the docket record in a prior (domestic relations) proceeding. The contents of the document were corroborated by defendant's complaint in that proceeding, and the words "I" and "my" were used in conjunction with the first names of the defendant's three children. The Third Circuit held that this evidence of contents was sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of authentication.

  If the subject matter of a document refers to knowledge which only one individual would have had, it is sufficient to authenticate the document. 7 Wigmore on Evidence § 2148 (3d ed. 1940). Weinstein disagrees with the insistence on knowledge by only a single person, however, as he states, "the force of the inference decreases as the number of people who know the details... increases." Weinstein, § 901(b)(4)[01] at 901-46 and 47. In United States v. Wilson, 532 F.2d 641 (8th Cir.) cert denied, 429 U.S. 846 (1976), the prosecution sought to introduce a notebook which contained records of drug transactions. Though it was admitted that the author was unknown, the Court of Appeals upheld the authentication of the notebook on the grounds that only those persons acquainted with the particular transactions involved could have written the entries. *fn38"

  Some of the documents involved are said to contain information allegedly known only to a limited number of individuals who attended various meetings. The plaintiffs' own showing demonstrates that the number was not all that limited. However, to the extent that information contained in documents is corroborated by other admissible evidence, and is known to a limited number of individuals, these factors may be considered in determining whether sufficient evidence exists to authenticate it.

  c. Testimony and Interrogatory Answers

  Testimony before the JFTC, to the extent that it is found admissible, may also be used to authenticate other documents. Rule 901(b)(1) specifically holds testimony sufficient to establish authenticity.Where the testimony does not deal directly with any particular document offered, it may still be helpful in proving authenticity circumstantially. Weinstein P901(b)(1)[01] at 901-22. *fn39" We will have occasion below to consider JFTC testimony both as circumstantial and as direct evidence of authenticity.

  The answers to interrogatories may also be considered as "testimony" where they directly identify a document's source or author, corroborate the contents of particular documents, indicate the presence of a purported author at a meeting or a meeting's limited attendance, or otherwise establish the document's authenticity. While Weinstein notes that Interrogatories, Requests for Admissions and Stipulations "should be relied upon to dispose of most authentication problems before trial," § 901(b)(2)[01] at 901-23, the questions and answers in most of the interrogatories here are not specific enough to constitute a concession of authenticity.

  Since we have ruled that documents must be authenticated by admissible evidence, the admissibility of former testimony and the interrogatory answers themselves is an additional issue to be determined. Since the interrogatories may not be admissible against all defendants unless the plaintiff's conspiracy theory is accepted, this presents a particularly difficult situation. *fn40" Where authentication depends on the admissibility of an interrogatory, which itself depends on the plaintiffs' establishment of a conspiracy, the documents may be admitted "subject to" such a showing.

  d. Similarity to Other Authenticated Documents

  The example in 901(b)(3) allows the trier of fact to compare a document to another authenticated document in order to establish its authentication. In Dawson, supra, the employment applications involved were "on the same form" as applications whose authenticity was conceded. This, in conjunction with the circumstances of production, was considered sufficient to establish their authenticity, 586 F.2d at 1303. Many of the documents involved here are members of "groups" of documents, sharing similar characteristics.The authentication of one such document may serve as the basis for authenticating the others in a group on the basis of comparison, initially by the court, and ultimately by the trier of fact.

  e. Age of the Document

  A final element to be considered in our determination of authenticity is the age of the document. Rule 901(b)(8)(C) sets twenty years as the age requirement for "Ancient Documents." None of the documents now before us is twenty years old, although some may reach that age by the time of trial. *fn41" While Weinstein urges that this figure should not be regarded as an absolute necessity, *fn42" it is itself ten years shorter than the period under common law. *fn43" This is explained in the Advisory Committee Notes as being due to a shift in the underlying rationale for the rule from an emphasis on the unavailability of witnesses to an emphasis on the unlikeliness of a fraud over such an extended time period. While the Notes state that any time period is bound to be arbitrary, we feel that in the present case some additional indicia of authenticity are needed where all of the documents fall short of the twenty year limit.

  4. Self-Authentication Under Rule 902

  Rule 902 provides that certain documents are "self-authenticating" to the extent that no extrinsic evidence of authenticity is needed. Although 902(3) lists Foreign Public Documents as being of this type, the Advisory Committee Notes to 902(4) make it clear that 902(3) applies to the originals of documents and that 902(4) is the section applicable to copies. Under this section the copy must be certified as correct by either the custodian or other authorized person, and this certification must itself conform to Rule 902(3) in order to be received. *fn44"

  None of the documents involved here were obtained by plaintiffs from official custody or were accompanied by this type of official certification, and thus none are "self-authenticating" under Rule 902. Since the method of authentication provided in Rule 902 is not exclusive, however, plaintiffs' failure to procure certified copies does not bar authentication of the documents under Rule 901.

  5. "Best Evidence" Rule

  An issue closely related to authentication is set forth in Article X, often referred to as the "Best Evidence Rule." Rule 1002 states that the original of any writing is required, "except as otherwise provided in these rules..."

  One such exception is stated in Rule 1003, which admits "duplicates" *fn45" to the same extent as the originals, provided there are no genuine questions as to authenticity and it would not be "unfair" to admit them in the circumstances. The documents involved are all duplicates and would satisfy these conditions. However, the protocols and testimony which plaintiffs offer may be viewed as public records, and there is authority which suggests that Rule 1005 supersedes Rule 1003 with respect to public documents. *fn46"

  Rule 1005 deals specifically with Public Records, and provides two alternative methods of satisfying the "best evidence" requirements for copies of documents falling within its scope. The first is by providing a copy certified as correct in accordance with Rule 902, which as we noted supra has not been done with respect to any of the documents under consideration here. The second method is by presenting testimony of a witness who has compared the copy with the original. Only if neither of the foregoing can be obtained by "reasonable diligence" may other evidence of the contents be given. The plaintiffs have offered no testimony on the correctness of the copies offered, and have repeatedly asserted their intention to rest on their documentary evidence. Since "reasonable diligence" has not been exercised, the final clause of the rule is also inapplicable.

  This section is one which, it turns out, was not invoked by the parties. Rather, we called it to the parties' attention as we were surveying the law after the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, concerned that, in the welter of argument, it had in fact been invoked directly or indirectly. By letter, we inquired of the parties about its applicability. Plaintiffs replied in their letter to the Court of August 5, 1980, that:

  defendants have not objected to the admissibility of the protocols or transcripts of testimony, or any other public records (or any other document for that matter) on the grounds that they are not true and ...

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