Appeal from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County in case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Richael Lynn Darr, No. 4981 Civil Term, 1978.
John B. Mancke, Mancke & Lightman, for appellant.
Harold H. Cramer, Assistant Attorney General, with him Ward T. Williams, Chief Counsel, and Harvey Bartle, III, Acting Attorney General, for appellee.
Judges Mencer, Rogers and Craig, sitting as a panel of three. Opinion by Judge Mencer.
[ 53 Pa. Commw. Page 491]
Richael Lynn Darr (appellant) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County which sustained the suspension of appellant's driving privileges for 165 days. We affirm.
The chronology of events leading to the suspension of appellant's license is as follows:
Appellant was convicted of traffic violations in July and August of 1976, resulting in an accumulation of more than six points on his record. Consequently, he was required to pass a special examination and his license was suspended for 15 days.
In April of 1977, appellant was convicted of another offense and was assigned three more points. Again, his record showed more than six points, necessitating a hearing pursuant to Section 1538(b)(1) of the Vehicle Code (Code), 75 Pa. C.S. § 1538(b)(1).*fn1 No sanction other than the points was imposed.
[ 53 Pa. Commw. Page 492]
In April of 1978, appellant was cited once more and, for the third time, his point total exceeded six points. As a result, another hearing was held pursuant to Section 1538 of the Code, and on October 29, 1978, appellant's license was suspended for 30 days, effective November 30, 1978.
In the meantime, in August 1978, appellant received another citation and was assessed four more points. These four points were added to the seven points on his record at the time. Because this resulted in an accumulation of 11 points, the Department of Transportation (Department) suspended appellant's license pursuant to Section 1539 of the Code, 75 Pa. C.S. § 1539.*fn2 The appellant appealed to the lower court, which affirmed the suspension. This appeal followed.
The appellant first argues that, because he was already under a 30-day suspension, any further suspension should have been ...