she decides are consonant with her religious beliefs.
Petitioner's refusal to take the modified oath of allegiance without further qualification is fatal to her petition for naturalization. One "cannot bargain and specify his terms for citizenship." In re MacKay, 71 F. Supp. 397, 400 (N.D.Ind.1947). Congress has set out certain specific statutory requirements for citizenship and, since the burden is on petitioner to show compliance with them, they should be carefully followed. This is especially so in this case because petitioner is required to take only a modified oath of allegiance and as the court stated in In re Matz, 296 F. Supp. 927, 933 (E.D.Ca.1969), "(t)he present requirement of "work of national importance under civilian direction' is sufficiently tolerant toward conscientious objectors that it must be strictly adhered to." Here, petitioner has stated that she will swear to the modified oath only if she can qualify it. In my view, this amounts to a sufficient mental reservation to preclude her naturalization. See In re Williams, 474 F. Supp. 384, 387 (D.Ariz.1979), where, under facts virtually identical to those in the case at bar, the court denied a Jehovah's Witness' petition for naturalization, declaring that "naturalization is clearly a privilege to be given or withheld as Congress shall determine and petitioner has failed to meet the requirements set out by Congress."
Petitioner contends that In re Battle, 379 F. Supp. 334 (E.D.N.Y.1974), and In re Pisciattano, 308 F. Supp. 818 (D.Conn.1970), support her petition for naturalization. I do not agree. Both Pisciattano and Battle involved petitioners who were also Jehovah's Witnesses and were opposed to any type of service in the Armed Forces of the United States because of their religious training and beliefs. In both cases, petitioners were granted naturalization because they were willing to take the modified oath of allegiance and to obey the laws of the United States. In this case, petitioner has testified that she alone will decide which laws she will obey and that she will not take the modified oath without qualification.
Petitioner also relies on In re Ramadass, 445 Pa. 86, 284 A.2d 133 (1971), in support of her petition. In Ramadass, petitioner stated that he was willing to perform work of national importance under civilian direction when required by law, even as a substitute for military service, so long as it was not in the military area. Here, petitioner testified that she would not perform any type of work of national importance, whether in the military area or not, if such work was a substitute for military service. Therefore, Ramadass is distinguishable from the instant case.
Plaintiff explained her philosophy by referring to the Bible, John 17:16 and James 1:27. Perhaps Congress, when it enacted the naturalization statutes, had Luke 11:21 to 23 in mind. I do not know, but in any event, since petitioner cannot take the oath without mental reservation, naturalization must be denied.