The opinion of the court was delivered by: GILES
In her first amended complaint, plaintiff alleges sexual harassment by her defendant-employer in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-16. She claims that on December 12, 1978, within one hundred eighty days of the alleged discriminatory practice, charges of employment discrimination were filed with the Philadelphia District Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") as required by Title VII.
Section 706(c) of Title VII establishes the procedure for the enforcement of its substantive provisions and provides, in pertinent part, that
In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a State, or political subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no charge may be filed under subsection (b) of this section (with the EEOC) by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated....
Defendant correctly states that the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission ("PHRC"), acting pursuant to the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, Pa.Stat.Ann.Tit. 43, §§ 951-963 ( Purdon 1964 Pa. Super. 1980-81 ), is the state administrative body empowered to grant relief. The PHRC is a "706 agency", that is, a state agency which "satisfies the criteria stated in Section 706(c)." 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.3 & 1601.74.
Compliance with Section 706(c) is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the bringing of a Title VII action in federal district court. Black Musicians v. Local 60-471, American Federation of Musicians, 375 F. Supp. 902 (W.D.Pa.1974), aff'd mem., 544 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1976), Bell v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 448 F. Supp. 133 (E.D.Pa.1978). This prerequisite may be satisfied, though, by the EEOC by its internal procedures, pursuant to regulation, as well as by the plaintiff.
In Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 100 S. Ct. 2486, 2491-93, 65 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1980), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522, 525, 92 S. Ct. 616, 618, 30 L. Ed. 2d 679 (1972), to the effect that "(n)othing in the (Civil Rights) Act suggests that the state proceedings may not be initiated by the EEOC acting on behalf of the complainant rather than by the complainant himself." The Supreme Court has thus repeatedly held that state proceedings are properly instituted and § 706(c) is satisfied by the EEOC when it promptly forwards a copy of plaintiff's charge to the appropriate state agency.
The EEOC has adopted a deferral procedure "to simplify filing procedures for parties ... and thereby avoid the accidental forfeiture of important Federal rights." McAdams v. Thermal Industries, 428 F. Supp. 156, 158 n.6 (W.D.Pa.1977); see 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13. This regulation mandates that if a charge is filed prematurely with the EEOC, a copy must be transmitted to the appropriate 706 agency. The charge itself is held by the EEOC until the termination of the local or state proceedings or the expiration of the sixty-day waiting period, whichever occurs first. The EEOC may then process the case.
Courts have consistently held that EEOC compliance with this regulation satisfies the jurisdictional prerequisite of exhaustion of state and local remedies. See Shehadeh v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 193 U.S. App. D.C. 326, 595 F.2d 711, 717 n.20 (D.C.Cir.1978); Flesch v. Eastern Pennsylvania Psychiatric Institute, 434 F. Supp. 963, 969 n.3 (E.D.Pa.1977). The deferral procedure is "sufficiently in compliance with the dictates of the Act to defeat a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1)." Winsey v. Pace College, 394 F. Supp. 1324, 1328 (S.D.N.Y.1975). As was well stated in McAdams v. Thermal Industries, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 156 (W.D.Pa.1977).
Id. 161 (citations omitted).
Defendant cites Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1971) in support of its position. This case is inapposite. There, an action was dismissed when plaintiff filed a discrimination charge with neither the state agency nor with the EEOC. However, in the present case, plaintiff alleges in her complaint she did file charges with the EEOC. Likewise inapposite is Albano v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 1209 (S.D.N.Y.1979), aff'd., 622 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1980). There, the court granted a motion for summary judgment on the grounds ...