and argument and we cannot ignore Plaintiff's narrow assertions in this case. Despite Plaintiff's previous assertions that the Defendants had engaged in racial and sexual discrimination, Plaintiff insists these allegations are not presented in this case. Next, Plaintiff insists that this action is not concerned with her due process rights as a one-time member of the Corporation. Plaintiff's present claim is that of a member of the public to free speech and free access to a place of public accommodation without threat of criminal trespass action. We do not intimate that Plaintiff waived federal claims which could be adjudicated now; rather, the Court need not reach these issues here.
Bridges' First Amendment claims of right of access to radio air waves are effectively defeated by the Supreme Court's holding in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 99 S. Ct. 1435, 59 L. Ed. 2d 692 (1979), where the Court struck down FCC rules requiring cable systems to hold out certain channels on a first come non-discriminatory basis. " "In the area of discussion of public issues Congress chose to leave broad journalistic discretion with the licensee.' " Congress rejected an attempt to impose even " "a limited obligation on broadcasters to turn over their microphones to persons wishing to speak out on certain public issues.' " 440 U.S. at 703, 99 S. Ct. at 1443, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 704, quoting Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 93 S. Ct. 2080, 36 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1973). Thus, access to broadcast media is not a matter of constitutional or statutory right. See also McIntire v. Wm. Penn Broadcasting Co., 151 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1945). Furthermore, it is not clear that Bridges has been denied access to the airwaves. While the letter to Bridges from the Board of Directors states she may not host or produce a program for the station, Bridges stated she still produces programs (but does not host them) and at the final argument on June 23, 1980, it was brought out that she has continued to produce programs on the air.
Thus, we consider what right Bridges may have as a member of the public to enter the physical facility divorced from her right to host or produce a program. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq., prohibits discrimination in places of public accommodation on the basis of race, color, religion or national origin. Plaintiff continues to insist that she does not base this action on any claim of racial discrimination, but solely as a member of the public.
The Court does not find the Station's premises to be a public accommodation as that term is used in 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b). While a witness for Bridges stated that entry can usually be gained through an unlocked fire exit, Bridges herself stated a key was necessary, although the key was usually accessible. Zagaro stated that whatever else public access radio might mean, it did not mean access to the facilities unless related to programming and we agree.
Even assuming some right of the public to walk through the facility, Defendant would have the right to exclude individuals reasonably classified as disruptive. See Rosado Maysonet v. Solis, 409 F. Supp. 576 (D.Puerto Rico 1975). Plaintiff eliminated from the case the issue of racial and sexual discrimination and failed to prove that the Defendant's action in excluding her was other than reasonable. Thus we cannot find that the exclusion was unlawful. Accordingly, the Defendant's threat to treat Plaintiff's entrance onto the property as a trespass fails to entitle Plaintiff to any relief. Hurley v. Hinckley, 304 F. Supp. 704 (D.Mass.1969), aff'd per curiam sub nom Doyle v. O'Brien, 396 U.S. 277, 90 S. Ct. 603, 24 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1970). Our holding here should not be construed as affecting Bridges' right to the due process hearing ordered by Judge McGowan in the state court action based on a denial of membership rights, nor plaintiff's right to proceed with her racial or sex discrimination claims before the Human Relations Commission.
The foregoing shall constitute the Court's findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. An appropriate order will be entered denying Plaintiff's prayer for permanent injunction and dismissing the action.
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