Appeal from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County in case of Carl K. E. Miller v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Highways Claim No. 0907232, No. 383-A, September Term, 1971.
Carl K. E. Miller, Jr., Pro Se, appellant.
Marie Inyang, Special Assistant Attorney General, with her Ward T. Williams, Chief Counsel and Edward G. Biester, Jr., Attorney General, for appellee.
Judges Wilkinson, Jr., Mencer and MacPhail, sitting as a panel of three. Opinion by Judge Mencer.
[ 52 Pa. Commw. Page 128]
Carl K. E. Miller, Esquire (Miller), acting in propria persona, on January 29, 1979, filed a petition in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County requesting that court to hold a hearing to determine the amount of attorney, appraisal, and engineering fees to which he was allegedly entitled by virtue of Section 609 of the Eminent Domain Code (Code), Act of June 22, 1964, Special Sess., P.L. 84, as amended, 26 P.S. § 1-609. This petition was denied on July 5, 1979 by the court below and an appeal to this court followed. We affirm.
On September 20, 1971, Miller filed a petition for the appointment of viewers, alleging a de facto condemnation of a recorded easement which he owned over property acquired by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania under a 1965 declaration of taking of
[ 52 Pa. Commw. Page 129]
property owned by Sellersville Borough. A hearing was held before a jury of view, and Miller was awarded damages in the amount of $2,000. Miller appealed that award to the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County and, following a jury trial, a verdict was rendered for $7,400 in favor of Miller.
On August 12, 1974, Miller was paid the amount of the verdict and detention damages for a total payment of $10,378.25. Miller's then counsel of record, Thomas F. J. MacAniff, Esquire, on August 12, 1974, filed a praecipe with the Prothonotary of the court below, directing that the case be marked "settled, discontinued and ended," upon payment of costs. Costs were paid and the case was so marked.
We conclude, as did the court below, that the praecipe to settle, discontinue, and end the case constituted a final resolution of all issues in the case which could have been litigated at the time of filing the praecipe. In Sustrik v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 413 Pa. 324, 326-27, 197 A.2d 44, 46 (1964), it was held:
As between the parties involved, the settlement and discontinuance had the same effect as the entry of a judgment for the defendant in the proceedings. As between the parties to the action, it is ...