claim (Tr. 25). Therefore, arrangements were made for her to be examined by Kenneth F. Rhodes, a psychologist, and Dr. Donald B. Crider, a psychiatrist (Tr. 237).
Mr. Rhodes, the psychologist, examined plaintiff on May 24 and 25, 1978, in her home (Tr. 223). The IQ test revealed plaintiff's IQ to be 107, in the average or normal intellectual range. The test suggested plaintiff had the ability to enter into average educational or vocational developmental programs "where her emotional behaviorisms were accepted," an extremely ambiguous limitation (Tr. 224). An achievement test reflected reasonable abilities to interact successfully in society (Tr. 225). The Gestalt test suggested that plaintiff's ability to interact with her social contacts was acceptable (Tr. 227). The psychologist's report and summary are difficult to understand, an apparent result either of his inability to express himself grammatically or inability of the transcriber accurately to transcribe his report (Tr. 235, 236). However, he concluded that plaintiff demonstrated average intellectual abilities accompanied by acceptable academic achievement patterns for an individual who was not employed. She reflected the ability to react to society with acceptable actions and emotions. Mr. Rhodes found no severe evidence of psychological impairment (Tr. 236).
Dr. Crider evaluated plaintiff on September 1, 1978. Unfortunately, the doctor's report is not particularly helpful. He commented that actual documentation of plaintiff's fears could not be made by a psychiatric interview. He noted that plaintiff had not sought help for her psychiatric problem in the past few years. She was generally alert and self-care appeared to be normal. There was no evidence of delusions, misperceptions, or hallucinations. She was well oriented, her memory appeared to be intact, and her fund of information and intelligence were normal. His diagnosis, based on inferences from plaintiff's statements which were corroborated by her husband, was that of obsessive compulsive phobic reaction. She appeared to be severely functionally impaired (Tr. 237). Dr. Crider also completed an evaluation form in which he indicated that plaintiff had a moderately severe restriction of daily activities, constriction of interests, limitation on her ability to perform work requiring frequent contact with others, to perform simple tasks, and to perform repetitive tasks. A moderately severe impairment is one which seriously affects her ability to function (Tr. 238). She had a moderate impairment of her ability to relate to other people, to perform work where contact with others would be minimal, to perform complex tasks, and to perform varied tasks. She had a mild limitation of ability to comprehend and follow instructions and no deterioration in personal habits (Tr. 238).
Judge DiCenzo reviewed the evidence and determined that plaintiff could perform the duties of her usual occupations and therefore she was not entitled to supplemental security income (Tr. 21). The Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review (Tr. 11).
Review of the record of this case is extremely difficult. Judge DiCenzo followed the mandate of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit which requires him to develop the record for a pro se litigant, Livingston v. Califano, 614 F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 1980); Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1979), and obtained both psychological and psychiatric evaluations of plaintiff. The report of Mr. Rhodes, the psychologist, clearly supports the judge's finding that plaintiff had no psychiatric disorder. However, the report of Dr. Crider is ambiguous. While he indicated that documentation of plaintiff's fears could not be made by a psychiatric interview and that she was well oriented, her memory appeared to be intact, her fund of information and intelligence were normal, and there was no evidence of delusions, misperceptions, or hallucinations, his diagnosis was obsessive compulsive phobic reaction and he expressed his opinion that plaintiff appeared to be severely functionally impaired (Tr. 237). Further, his completion of the evaluation of her impairment raises serious questions as to her ability to return to any of her former jobs (Tr. 238), particularly the moderately severe limitation of her ability to perform work requiring frequent contact with others, to perform simple tasks, and to perform repetitive tasks. These impairments would clearly appear to affect her ability to work as a shoe salesman, work in a shoe factory, in a suit factory, as a bar maid, and as a waitress. Her age, together with her degenerative disc disease would appear to limit her ability to work for the railroad as a hooker on a crane and in the car shop. However, the judge failed to give his reasons for finding plaintiff could return to these jobs in light of Dr. Crider's report. It is noted that Dr. Crider was selected by the Social Security Administration for plaintiff's psychiatric examination. A more detailed analysis appears to be required by the Court of Appeals, Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d 309 (3d Cir. 1974).
Judge DiCenzo failed to make any finding as to plaintiff's credibility as required by Kephart v. Richardson, 505 F.2d 1085, 1089-1090 (3d Cir. 1974). Plaintiff's testimony was compelling and it is hard to imagine how she could perform substantial gainful activity if her testimony of fear of leaving the house was true. Plaintiff testified that the easiest job she had held was cutting collars. However, to perform that job she had to stand and she was unable to do that any more. In addition, she was unable to sit too long. In his questioning Judge DiCenzo failed to ask plaintiff to describe her various types of work and to find out whether they permitted her to alternate between sitting and standing. However, the jobs of waitress and bar maid would appear to require substantial standing and substantial ability to relate to other people. The judge found that plaintiff's impairments were chronic urethal obstruction, cystitis and diabetes mellitus. He made no finding that she suffered from diffuse degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine although this diagnosis was well documented by x-rays (Tr. 207, 214, 124, 248). Further, he made no finding that she suffered from chronic irritable bladder syndrome (Tr. 124), anxiety neurosis (Tr. 129), spastic bowel syndrome (Tr. 129), and obsessive compulsive phobic reaction (Tr. 237). He may have had a valid basis for failing to include these impairments in his findings but since he did not discuss his reasons, this court is left with speculation. Since the record fails to reveal the basis for Judge DiCenzo's findings, it is recommended that the parties' Motions for Summary Judgment be denied and that the action be remanded to the Secretary for reconsideration.
In accordance with the Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 4 of the Local Rules for Magistrates, the parties are allowed ten (10) days from the date of service to file objections to this report and recommendation.