turnkey and incarcerated in a holding cell for an hour and a half to two hours. A statement was taken by another officer in which Morrison gave substantially the same information as he had given previously, that he had loaned his car to Mulkerrin and that was all he knew about the incident. Morrison was thus in custody for a total of approximately four hours.
21. In the meantime, Mrs. Morrison had contacted an attorney, Lisle Zehner, Esq., and the attorney, in attempting to find out whether or not Clarence Morrison was incarcerated, made some five or six telephone calls to various police telephone numbers before finally being put in touch with Morrison at the Public Safety Building. Mr. Zehner described his contacts with the Police Department as a "conspiracy of silence".
22. When Zehner first contacted Detective Fox that night he said he would file a suit for immediate release.
23. However, at approximately 8 P.M., Zehner was told that Morrison was at the Public Safety Building, was not under arrest, and could leave any time. He thereupon spoke with Morrison and told him to leave immediately. Morrison had previously been told he would be driven back to Sunny Jim's, but when no ride was offered, he got a cab at approximately 10 P.M., went back to Sunny Jim's to pick up his car, and proceeded to his home.
24. Zehner was contacted the next day by Detective Fox to see if the matter could be straightened out, but no resolution was reached.
25. As time went on, Morrison's children heard rumors that he had been "busted" in a drug raid (some of the Detectives involved were from the Drug Enforcement Division). Some three months later, although employed and earning $ 230 a week with Coleman Mulkerrin, Morrison moved to the Punxsutawney area from his home in Emsworth, because he didn't want his children to believe their father was a "dope dealer".
26. Following his move to Punxsutawney, Morrison was out of work for eight months.
27. While at the Public Safety Building, Morrison was placed in a filthy, dark and bug infested cell for approximately one and a half to two hours and as a result of his confinement felt nervous. Other than this, no emotional distress or mental anguish of any kind was suffered by Morrison, nor was there evidence that the move to Punxsutawney was in any way directly related to the conduct of the officers in the incident set forth above, other than the rumors with which the Detectives had no connection.
28. In Sunny Jim's at the time of the incident were the bar maid, a Robert Murphy and his wife, who lived above the bar and who testified for Morrison at the hearing, two young people who were playing pool, and a Franny Reed. There was no evidence whatsoever that any of these persons ever spoke to the Plaintiff about the incident.
The Plaintiff bases a strong attack on the contention that the Detectives brought about an illegal arrest because under Pennsylvania law warrantless arrests are prohibited for misdemeanors committed outside the arresting officer's presence. The Plaintiff's theory is that the charges were later reduced before the Magistrate to criminal trespass, which is a misdemeanor, and that the officers under the circumstances knew that kidnapping, burglary and aggravated assault could not be sustained, that these charges were a mere sham, that the John Doe warrant was invalid,
and the arrest was also invalid. We do not, however, reach these questions, focusing on the good faith defense of the officers.
Section 1983 does not provide a remedy for common law torts. Instead, it creates a federal cause of action against those who "acting under color of state law" cause a "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws (of the United States)." It is the violation of Federal Constitutional rights which may be redressed, not the violation of state law.
As said by Justice Douglas in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 108, 65 S. Ct. 1031, 1038, 89 L. Ed. 1495 (1945):
"But there is no warrant for treating the question in state law terms. The problem is not whether state law has been violated but whether an inhabitant of a State has been deprived of a federal right by one who acts under "color of any law'."
Cf. Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1973).
In Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S. Ct. 223, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1964), and Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S. Ct. 168, 4 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1959), cited to us by the Plaintiff, the Supreme Court focused on the requirement of probable cause in determining whether warrantless arrests were constitutionally valid. However, in a 1983 action, the defendants may justify the arrest, if made in good faith and if the officers reasonably believe they have probable cause.
In Brubaker v. King, 505 F.2d 534, 536-37 (7th Cir. 1974) (Senior United States Circuit Judge William H. Hastie of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation), stated:
"The Supreme Court has held, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1967), and has recently reaffirmed, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1974), that the defense of good faith and probable cause is available to police officers in a civil rights action based on § 1983. In Pierson, the Court explained how the two elements of good faith and probable cause were to be applied as a standard: "(If) the jury found that the officers reasonably believed in good faith that the arrest was constitutional, then a verdict for the officers would follow even though the arrest was in fact unconstitutional.' 386 U.S. at 557, 87 S. Ct. at 1219. The test, thus, under § 1983 is not whether the arrest was constitutional or unconstitutional or whether it was made with or without probable cause, but whether the officer believed in good faith that the arrest was made with probable cause and whether that belief was reasonable. n1