while legal proceedings are pending does not, in the absence of more specific allegations of interference with counsel, constitute a deprivation of civil rights. Mayberry therefore has stated no claim predicated solely on his having been transferred to Dallas at a time when charges were pending against him in Chester County.
Second, the defendants argue that Mayberry's claims under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, arising out of the alleged conspiracy to transfer him to Farview State Hospital, should be dismissed for failure to comply with the threshold requirement of Article III of the Constitution, namely, that there be an actual case or controversy capable of adjudication.
In both their motion to dismiss and their motion for summary judgment the defendants contend that because Mayberry made no allegation in his complaint that he was in fact transferred to Farview, and because since the filing of his complaint he has not been transferred to Farview, he has at best posed a hypothetical possibility of injury that is insufficient to meet the requirements of Article III.
Article III requires that those who seek to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts must allege an actual case or controversy. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493, 94 S. Ct. 669, 38 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1974); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-101, 88 S. Ct. 1942, 20 L. Ed. 2d 947 (1968). To meet this requirement, plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief in federal court must allege actual or imminent injury, O'Shea, supra, 414 U.S. at 493, 94 S. Ct. 669, and the injury must be "real and immediate," not "conjectural" or "hypothetical." Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109-110, 89 S. Ct. 956, 22 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1969).
Here, Mayberry's allegation that there was a conspiracy to transfer him to Farview may have been sufficient to establish imminent danger or injury to him at the time the complaint was filed. However, over fifteen months after the filing of the complaint, at the time defendants filed their motion for summary judgment, Mayberry had still not been transferred to Farview. (See Exhibit "C", Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment). Now, some five years after the filing of the suit, there is nothing in the record to reflect that there has been such a transfer. Mayberry did argue, in his memorandum of law in support of his answer to defendants' motion to dismiss, that on June 5, 1973, sometime Before this suit was filed, he was transferred to Farview where he was injected with the tranquilizer Prolixin. However, even if I were to assume that this prior transfer to Farview were for some reason illegal, "(p)ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief, . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects." O'Shea, supra, 414 U.S. at 495-96, 94 S. Ct. at 676. In the suit now before me, Mayberry has not alleged facts sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine threat that he will be transferred illegally to Farview or that there is an ongoing conspiracy to harm him after transfer there.
Although I hold that Mayberry has not alleged a sufficient case or controversy to invoke the court's jurisdiction here, I note that he is not without recourse if a genuine dispute should arise. Mayberry in this suit seeks an injunction prohibiting the defendants from transferring him to Farview unless he is given notice, a psychiatric examination, a hearing, and the assistance of counsel. During the pendency of this action, Judge R. Dixon Herman of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania entered a declaratory judgment that in effect requires that state prisoners in Pennsylvania be accorded the rights that Mayberry seeks here before they are transferred to Farview State Hospital. United States ex rel. Souder v. Watson, 413 F. Supp. 711, 717 (M.D.Pa.1976). Thus, if at sometime in the future Mayberry should be confronted with imminent transfer to Farview or is transferred without being accorded his rights, he will be entitled to relief by filing suit at that time.
Finally, the defendants argue that Mayberry's claims based upon the alleged attempt to murder him while he was being transferred from Chester County Prison to the State Correctional Institution at Dallas are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, because as noted above, Mayberry pleaded guilty to criminal charges in connection with the incident that occurred while he was being transferred. Defendants argue that Mayberry's guilty plea constituted an admission of the truth of the charges against him, and that the plea conclusively established that it was he who attacked the prison guards transporting him, with the result that he is estopped from contending, as he attempts to do in the instant suit, that it was the guards who attacked him.
The majority rule is that a "judgment of conviction, based on a plea of guilty, is conclusive in a civil suit between the same parties on all of the issues that would have been determined by a conviction after a contested trial." 1B Moore's Federal Practice, P 0.418, p. 2706 (1974). In this circuit, the leading case is United States v. Accardo, 113 F. Supp. 783 (D.N.J.1953), Affirmed, 208 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1953), Cert. denied, 347 U.S. 952, 74 S. Ct. 677, 98 L. Ed. 1098 (1954). In Accardo, the government sued to revoke the naturalization of an alien on the ground that he did not reveal in his petition for naturalization that he had pleaded guilty to conspiracy to operate an unregistered still. The issue before the court was whether he could at the revocation hearing deny his guilt on the charges to which he had earlier pleaded guilty, and the court held that the guilty plea constituted an estoppel of record on the issue of his guilt. The court's rationale was that to permit defendants subsequently to deny their guilt on charges to which they had pleaded guilty would result in endless, useless litigation. More recently, Accardo was cited by the court in Hooper v. Guthrie, 390 F. Supp. 1327 (W.D.Pa.1975) as support for its holding that the plaintiff there was precluded by a guilty plea from subsequently contesting in a § 1983 suit an allegedly illegal search that unearthed evidence against him on the criminal charges to which he pleaded guilty.
Numerous other courts outside of this circuit have also invoked the principle of collateral estoppel in cases where a criminal defendant who pleaded guilty to the charges against him later brought a civil action raising an issue adjudicated by the guilty plea. E. g., Nathan v. Tenna Corp., 560 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1977); Mastracchio v. Ricci, 498 F.2d 1257 (1st Cir. 1974); Brazzell v. Adams, 493 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1974); Metros v. United States District Court for the District of Colorado, 441 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1971).
Assuming then that as a general matter it is proper to apply principles of collateral estoppel to bar the claim of a civil litigant who has previously pleaded guilty to a criminal charge involving the same issues, the question is whether Mayberry is estopped on the record here from raising claims based upon the January 21, 1974 incident that led to his being charged with the offenses to which he pleaded guilty. In Scooper-Dooper, Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840, 844 (3d Cir. 1974), the court ruled that three requirements must be met before collateral estoppel may be invoked:
(a) the issue decided in the prior litigation must be identical with the issue presented in the action in question;
(b) the prior litigation must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and