The opinion of the court was delivered by: LORD, III
This is an action to recover the purchase price of goods sold and delivered. Plaintiff is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania and the defendant is a New Jersey corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey. Jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship. Service upon the defendant was effected under the provisions of the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 5321 et seq. (Purdon 1979) (Pennsylvania's "long-arm statute"). Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss alleging lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. The motion will be denied.
Section 5322(a) of the long-arm statute defines certain specific activities that, under the statute, will subject a nonresident to Pennsylvania jurisdiction. However, it is no longer necessary to wrestle with the problem of whether a given defendant's conduct falls within any one or more of the categories of subsection (a). Subsection (b) of § 5322 provides as follows:
(b) Exercise of full constitutional power over nonresidents. In addition to the provisions of subsection (a) the jurisdiction of the tribunals of this Commonwealth shall extend to all persons who are not within the scope of section 5301 (relating to persons) to the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States and may be based on the most minimum contact with this Commonwealth allowed under the Constitution of the United States.
And in Inpaco, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 413 F. Supp. 415 (E.D.Pa.1976) Judge Ditter succinctly described the effect of subsection (b) at page 418: "Instead of first determining whether a foreign corporation's contacts with the forum fall within the terms of the applicable statute, and, if so, then determining if the statute as so applied comports with due process, courts in Pennsylvania may now proceed directly to the constitutional issue." See also Proctor & Schwartz, Inc. v. Cleveland Lumber Co., 228 Pa.Super. 12, 323 A.2d 11 (1974).
Certain guiding criteria of constitutionality are by now pretty well established:
(1) The defendant must have minimum contacts with the territory of the forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945).
(2) The defendant must have purposefully availed itself of the privileges of acting within the forum state thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 1239, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283 (1958).
(3) The cause of action must arise from the defendant's activities within the forum state. See Southern Machine Co. v. Mohasco Industries, Inc., 401 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1968).
(4) The acts of the defendant must have a substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over it reasonable. See International Shoe Co., supra ; In- Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1972).
I have no difficulty in concluding that the defendant purposefully did an act within the Commonwealth. It voluntarily entered into a contract in Pennsylvania with a Pennsylvania corporation. Cf. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., supra. This is shown, inter alia, by the invoices attached as exhibits to the complaint that show four different orders from the defendant to the plaintiff, one in March and three in May of 1978. The contract was actually concluded in Pennsylvania, since acceptance by the plaintiff in Pennsylvania was the final necessary ingredient to the formation of the contract. The contract was to be performed entirely within Pennsylvania by the manufacturer of the valves embraced by the contract which were to be shipped from and through Pennsylvania to the defendant in New Jersey.
When obligations entered into by a foreign corporation have a realistic economic impact on the commerce of this Commonwealth and where the defendant should reasonably have foreseen that the transaction would have consequences in this Commonwealth the defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of acting within the Commonwealth.
Proctor & Schwartz, Inc. v. Cleveland Lumber Co., supra, 228 Pa.Super. at 19-20, 323 A.2d at 15.
Thus in this case by entering into a contract in Pennsylvania that called for performance in Pennsylvania and payment to a corporation in Pennsylvania, the defendant has fulfilled the criterion of purposefully availing itself ...