Appeal from the Orders of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review in cases of In Re: Claim of Thomas Balsamo, No. B-152753; In Re: Claim of Edmund J. Borczuch, No. B-152754; In Re: Claim of Jack Bradac, No. B-152755; In Re: Claim of James H. Mansfield, No. B-152756; In Re: Claim of Owen F. Maloney, No. B-152757; In Re: Claim of Frank Nykiel, Jr., No. B-152758; In Re: Claim of Jay J. Nestor, No. B-152759; In Re: Claim of Mark M. Riggs, No. B-152761 and In Re: Claim of Rowland D. Webb, No. B-152760.
David S. Pollock, with him Jubelirer, Pass & Intrieri, for petitioners.
GuruJodha Singh Khalsa, Assistant Attorney General, with him Richard Wagner, Chief Counsel, and Edward G. Biester, Jr., Attorney General, for respondent.
Judges Blatt, DiSalle and MacPhail, sitting as a panel of three.
[ 45 Pa. Commw. Page 222]
We are asked to decide whether the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) improperly affirmed the referee's denial of benefits to Thomas Balsamo et al. (Petitioners).*fn1 We need only determine the applicability of Section 402(d) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Act), Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. § 802(d), the labor dispute section, for Petitioners concede that if that section applies, they cannot prevail.
Petitioners worked for Quaker State Coca-Cola Bottling Company (Employer) on a day to day basis as "extra" truck drivers, reporting to work only when notified to do so. Some were members of Teamsters Local 249, and some were not, but none worked after June 30, 1977, the day on which the collective bargaining agreement between Local 249 and Employer expired. Prior to June 30, Petitioner Balsamo had worked for 23 consecutive work days. From July 1, 1977 to September 1, 1977, members of Local 249 were on strike, and Employer did not call any of the Petitioners
[ 45 Pa. Commw. Page 223]
to work. In fact, none of Quaker State's employes worked, since, as the referee found, there was no work for anyone because of the strike.*fn2
Section 402(d) of the Act renders an employe ineligible for compensation for any week:
In which his unemployment is due to a stoppage of work, which exists because of a labor dispute (other than a lock-out) at the factory, establishment or other premises at which he is or was last employed: Provided, That this subsection shall not apply if it is shown that (1) he is not participating in, or directly interested in, the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work, and (2) he is not a member of an organization which is participating in, or directly interested in, the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work, and (3) he does not belong to a grade or class of workers of which, immediately before the commencement of the stoppage, there were members employed at the premises at which the stoppage occurs, any of whom are participating in, or directly interested in, the dispute.
An analysis under this section requires an inquiry into whether a claimant's unemployment is due to a work stoppage which is the result of a labor dispute and, if so, whether the claimant falls within one of the three enumerated exceptions. In this case, Petitioners argue that given the tenuous nature of their employment, i.e., the fact that they could not report for work ...