Ernst carried $ 1,894,933.50 on its books as a receivable, which represented Ernst's actual loss on the A-5 Project plus a $ 600,000 (approximately 331/3%) profit.
82. Whatever the accounting practices of Ernst may have been, it goes only to the weight to be given Ernst's claims for inefficiencies. The figure of $ 1,894,933.50 was in fact reduced to $ 1,294,933 by the elimination of the $ 600,000 profit figure, to represent the cost receivable.
83. There is no basis in Ernst's accounting practices for refusing to allow the Count II claim in full.
84. Thus, we find the Plaintiff on Count Two to be entitled to $ 1,421,920 ($ 1,484,000 less $ 62,080 under the $ 500 deductible), with interest from December 12, 1975-$ 1,732,794.60.
85. During the course of the Project, Ernst performed work pursuant to field authorizations and directives issued by Koppers. Field authorizations were issued to accomplish work not shown, or to correct work shown on construction drawings which involved field interferences. Ernst performed the work and thereafter calculated the journeyman hours and materials required to perform such work. The calculation was set forth and priced on an Ernst "work order" form which was submitted to Koppers as a bill. The labor was priced at the journeyman rate then in effect, and six such orders are the subject of Count Three, for an aggregate of $ 9,581.64, which amount has not been paid.
86. We find that the work with respect to such orders was performed by Ernst at Koppers' request, and the price fixed by Ernst for such work was reasonably and correctly computed. Plaintiff is entitled to recover for these work orders in the amount of $ 9,581.64, with interest from October 15, 1975-$ 11,775.66.
87. Koppers had a large field force to assist in the Project, and the services of these forces were considered part of the original J&L contract. They were later billed to J&L under deviations which followed J&L authorizations or extra work orders, and, in some instances, they were attempted to be billed or back charged to Ernst. These form the basis of the Defendant's counterclaim and there is no contractual basis for charging these amounts to Ernst. We find there is no proof for this aspect or the other aspects of the counterclaim.
88. We find the contract retention of $ 60,430 by Koppers to have been unjustified and award this sum to Ernst, together with interest thereon at 6% Per annum from December 12, 1975 (the date of demand for payment) $ 73,691.48.
89. We award to Ernst on its Count II claim, the sum of $ 1,421,920, with interest at 6% Per annum from December 12, 1975 $ 1,732,794.60.
90. We award to Ernst on its Count III claim, the sum of $ 9,581.64, with interest at 6% Per annum from October 15, 1975 $ 11,775.66.
91. All other claims made by Ernst are denied, as well as the counterclaims of Koppers.
A. COUNT I
1. The Delays and Their Impact
Count I of the Complaint seeks damages arising from delays imposed upon Ernst during the course of its work as electrical subcontractor to Koppers on the construction of an A-5 coke oven battery and related facilities for J&L.
The record in this case is replete with evidence of Koppers' numerous changes in the drawings, to the point where a demand was made for a cut-off date so that the Project could finally be completed. Many interferences resulted to the work of subcontractors, both from revisions and changes in the scope of the work. Koppers had substantial difficulties in procurement of supplies and equipment which caused costly delay to Ernst.
As a general proposition, the law imposes liability upon a general contractor for additional costs for delays caused by him. Thus, in Johnson v. Fenestra, Incorporated (Erection Division), 305 F.2d 179, 181 (3rd Cir. 1962), it is stated:
"Because the contract was to be performed in Pennsylvania and had most of its other contacts with that state, Pennsylvania contract law determines whether the prime contractor's conduct in connection with the agreed supplying of materials constituted a compensable breach.
It is a familiar rule of contract law, adopted and applied by the courts of Pennsylvania, that a party breaches a bilateral contract when he does improperly or fails to do something which he has expressly or impliedly undertaken to do to facilitate the performance of the other party. Just Mfg. Co. v. Falck, 1946, 354 Pa. 421, 47 A.2d 659; Bodman v. Nathaniel Fisher & Co., 1920, 268 Pa. 535, 112 A. 99; See Sheehan v. Pittsburg, 1905, 213 Pa. 133, 62 A. 642. Actually, this rule is but an application of the more general principle that a contract is to be enforced so as to give effect to the reasonable expectations created by the parties in entering into the bargain. See In re Kellett Aircraft Corp., 3d Cir. 1951, 191 F.2d 231; Restatement of Contracts § 315; 5 Williston, Contracts, rev. ed. 1937, § 1293A.