19. The IRS investigation took over two years. But there is no evidence that this length of time was unreasonable given the apparent complexity of this net worth tax case or that it was taken solely to further a criminal investigation. The defendant did not ask the agents why the investigation took so long and the Court finds no evidence on which to find that it was for reasons other than to conduct a complicated tax investigation with both civil and criminal aspects.
20. At the time the summonses were issued, the IRS institutionally was committed to conducting a joint criminal and civil tax investigation. A special agent and a revenue agent were assigned to the case, evidence of interest in both criminal responsibility and civil tax liability. The special agents testified that they were interested in both facets of the investigation, which is consistent with their duties, as specified in Section 210 of the Handbook for Special Agents. Although the agents met or contacted Strike Force personnel on six occasions and received the information stimulating the investigation from the Strike Force, the Court is not convinced, given the contrary testimony and evidence, that the IRS was pursuing solely a criminal investigation.
21. From the evidence presented, the Court concludes that the summonses issued by the IRS agents before June 8, 1977, were in aid of both the civil and criminal tax investigation. Although the defendant was given the opportunity to fully question the agents and ask them about the purpose of each summons, he did not do so, and therefore, the Court accepts as true, the agents' testimony that each was, at least in part, issued to determine civil tax liability.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the above findings of fact, the Court concludes that the summonses issued by the IRS agents in this case prior to June 8, 1977, were issued in accordance with the requirements of law as outlined in United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 98 S. Ct. 2357, 57 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1978), and further elaborated upon by the Court of Appeals in their series of opinions in United States v. Genser, 582 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1978), 595 F.2d 146, (3d Cir. 1979) 602 F.2d 69 (3d Cir. 1979).
In LaSalle, the Supreme Court held that IRS summonses were legally issued if they were issued before the IRS recommended criminal prosecution to the Department of Justice and if they were issued in "good faith pursuit of the congressionally authorized purposes of § 7602."
In this case, all the summonses were issued prior to the IRS request that a grand jury investigation commence under the Justice Department's supervision. Therefore, the issue is whether the summonses were issued in good faith pursuit of the purposes of Section 7602.
Although the question is framed in terms of "good faith," the Supreme Court in LaSalle recognized that to defeat a summons a defendant would have to show that the summons was issued in bad faith. Here, the defendant has failed to meet that burden. For example, he has not shown that the summonses were issued solely to aid a criminal investigation or that that was all that the IRS was pursuing. See United States v. LaSalle National Bank, supra. Nor has he established that the IRS was merely serving as a collector of information for other departments of the government or that the IRS delayed its request for a grand jury investigation so that it could obtain additional information for a criminal investigation. See United States v. LaSalle National Bank, supra. In short, he has failed to present evidence of other indicators of bad faith. On the other hand, the evidence established that the summonses were issued, at least in part, to aid a civil tax investigation, which is one of the purposes of Section 7602. For these reasons, the Court was required to deny the defendant's motion to suppress.