employees," id. at 577, 98 S. Ct. at 2950. There is no evidence of record showing that Pennsylvania's patronage system has as a goal a work force selected by any proscribed discriminatory practice.
PATRONAGE HIRING AND THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS
Relying on Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S. Ct. 2673, 49 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1976), plaintiff asserts that PennDOT's use of patronage hiring violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. She argues that by imposing the patronage hiring system on her, PennDOT and the Commonwealth violated her First Amendment right to complete freedom in deciding whether to participate in, or abstain from, political associations. There is no evidence in this record that plaintiff was denied an application because of her political beliefs or associations, or that highway maintenance positions were given to members of only one political party. Moreover, as Judge Aldisert observed in his dissent in Rosenthal v. Rizzo, 555 F.2d 390, 396 (3d Cir. 1977), a majority of the Supreme Court justices in Elrod could not ascribe to the plurality's broad renunciation of the patronage system and that "in concurrence, Justice Stewart articulated the rule of the case: "(A) nonpolicy making, nonconfidential government employee (cannot) be discharged or threatened with discharge from a job that he is satisfactorily performing upon the sole ground of his political beliefs.' " 427 U.S. at 375, 96 S. Ct. at 2690. Elrod does not stand for the proposition that all patronage hiring infringes on First Amendment rights and, furthermore, as previously noted, there is no evidence that plaintiff's failure to obtain an application and appointment as a highway maintenance worker was conditioned in any way which infringed her right of political association.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. This court has jurisdiction over this action under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (3), 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), (4), and 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a).
2. Plaintiff has not satisfied the class action requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 and this action will not be certified as a class action.
3. Plaintiff has not established by competent statistics gross disparities in hiring patterns or practices which would constitute prima facie proof of discrimination against her or the class she purports to represent.
4. Plaintiff has not made out a prima facie case of discrimination against her in the hiring of highway maintenance workers in 1974.
5. Even if the statistical data and/or the evidence surrounding the hirings in 1974 were sufficient to show a prima facie case of sex discrimination, defendants have satisfied their burden of showing that the employment decisions were based on legitimate considerations and not an illegitimate consideration, such as sex.
6. Plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of discrimination in the 1975 hirings of two roadside attendants but defendants have satisfied their burden of showing that these employment decisions were based on legitimate considerations and not on an illegitimate consideration, such as sex.
7. Plaintiff has not established by competent proof that Pennsylvania's patronage system violates Title VII.
8. Plaintiff has not established by competent proof that Pennsylvania's patronage system infringed on her right of political association or in any way violated her rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
9. Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief or damages and judgment will be entered for all defendants.