Mechanic in the Machine Shop over Trent inasmuch as this Court finds as a matter of law that Allegheny has a bona fide seniority system which is not unlawful under the Equal Employment Opportunity Act (703(h) of Title VII).
3. This Court finds as a matter of law that Trent was unable to prove that Allegheny denied him a position of lead Mechanic in the Machine Shop because of his race.
a) Trent proved that he belonged to a racial minority, but he failed to prove that he applied for the job of lead Mechanic in the Machine Shop, (in fact, he admitted that he did not apply for it); he failed to prove that he was qualified; assuming for the sake of argument he proved he was qualified, he certainly did not prove that he was rejected because of lack of alleged qualifications; to the contrary, he was rejected because another qualified applicant with more seniority bid for the job. Finally, the position did not remain open, but was filled by a qualified candidate.
4. This Court finds as a matter of law that Trent did not meet the burden of proof demanded of the applicant claimant in this case since the job was awarded to an applicant with more seniority and also more qualifications. Further, Trent did not show that he had the requisite seniority and that he would have been discriminatorily rejected had he applied.
5. All of the alleged events of employment in 1952 and 1964, which took place before July 4, 1965, the effective date of the Act, are not actionable and are of no legal effect.
6. All of the matters that were raised in the Complaint of Trent to the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission on February 7, 1967, (which includes all of the alleged "1952" and "1964" continuing violations) became res adjudicata when it was then and there determined that as of February 18, 1969, there was no reason to believe that Allegheny's hiring and promotional practices as to its employees (including Trent) were discriminatory. Because Trent did not file suit in the District Court of the United States in 1969, after receiving the "right to sue letter", all claims of discrimination that allegedly continued from 1952 to February 18, 1969, are barred per the principles of Res Adjudicata.
7. Even assuming that the present Allegheny seniority system gives present effect to past acts of discrimination, since said past acts of discrimination allegedly occurred in 1952 and 1964, more than three hundred days prior to March 17, 1976, said alleged acts are not actionable. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). Further, a discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely charge is the legal equivalent of a discriminatory act which occurred before the act was passed. (In effect, the theory of "continuing violations" as advanced by the Plaintiff Trent, had been repudiated by the United States Supreme Court). See United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 to 558, 97 S. Ct. 1885, 52 L. Ed. 2d 571.
8. There is not sufficient evidence presented in this case to prove that Allegheny Airlines has unlawfully discriminated against Clarence Trent in violation of the Equal Employment Opportunities Act as alleged by the Plaintiff.
9. There was no credible proof presented at the hearing of this case that the International Association of Machinist Union has acquiesced and participated in any alleged discriminatory acts against Trent's right to employment opportunities, and further, there is no proof that said Union did in any way fail to protect Trent's employment interests.
The above-entitled action came for a hearing on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on April 13, 1979. Based upon a consideration of the briefs, affidavits and exhibits submitted by the parties and the arguments of Counsel, the Court determined that the claims of Plaintiffs Phillip Knight and George Miller, were not actionable and granted Motion for Summary Judgment;
Thereafter, the claims of Plaintiff Clarence Trent came to trial on April 19, 1979, before the undersigned sitting without a Jury;
At the conclusion of the testimony adduced and presented by and on behalf of the Plaintiff Clarence Trent, Counsel for the respective Defendants made Motions for Judgment of Dismissal upon the merits;
The Court, having heard the arguments of Counsel in support of and against said Motions, and having delivered oral Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and written Amended Findings of Fact and written Amended Conclusions of Law, does this 13th day of June, 1979, ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE that the said Defendants' Motions be, and the same hereby are granted, and said actions of all of the above-named Plaintiffs are hereby dismissed with prejudice, but each of the Defendants shall pay their own costs.
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