Appeal from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County in case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. William G. Ross, No. 336 April Term, 1977.
Richard E. Santee, Jr., with him Sigmon & Ross, P.C., for appellant.
Harold H. Cramer, Assistant Attorney General, with him Regis J. McCoy, Assistant Attorney General, Robert W. Cunliffe, Deputy Attorney General, and Gerald Gornish, Acting Attorney General, for appellee.
Judges Wilkinson, Jr., Mencer and Craig, sitting as a panel of three. Opinion by Judge Wilkinson, Jr.
[ 41 Pa. Commw. Page 354]
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County dismissing defendant-appellant's motion to set aside an assessment of points made by the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) and granting the appellee-Commonwealth's motion to quash. We affirm.
Appellant was arrested on February 1, 1977 for speeding. On April 21, 1977, appellant received notification from the Secretary of the assessment of three points pursuant to a conviction for speeding entered
[ 41 Pa. Commw. Page 355]
March 31, 1977.*fn1 Appellant's next action was the filing of a petition to set aside the point assessment. By order dated September 20, 1977, the lower court dismissed the petition, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review an assessment of points absent a suspension or revocation of operating privileges.
The law in this Commonwealth on the question presented by this appeal is well settled. Absent a specific provision in The Vehicle Code,*fn2 no appeal from an assessment of points will be entertained. This narrow issue has been examined in some detail by the Court in Department of Transportation v. Wagner, 17 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 26, 330 A.2d 867 (1975) making any further discussion purposeless.
Appellant strenuously asserts that an assessment of points without any provision for appeal is violative of his right to due process. We have carefully considered the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977) and the various federal cases cited in appellant's brief, and we conclude that nothing contained in the offered authority casts any doubts on the continued viability of our holding in Wagner, supra.
Accordingly, we will enter the ...