947, 952 (9th Cir. 1977); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pacific Indemnity Co., 76 F.R.D. 656, 658 (W.D.Pa.1977). But while not yet strictly defined, most courts have rejected the notion that a Rule 24(a)(2) "interest" must be "a specific legal or equitable interest," Blake v. Pallan, supra, 554 F.2d at 952, and have instead required only that the party seeking to intervene demonstrate a "direct, substantial, legally protectable interest in the proceedings," Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pacific Indemnity Co., supra, 76 F.R.D. at 658.
After careful consideration of the interests asserted by the movants in support of their Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2) motion to intervene, we hold that those interests, while important, are not sufficiently direct, substantial, legally protectable interests in the proceedings before us to warrant intervention as of right. As noted above, the narrow issue before this Court is not whether the plaintiffs have a right to obtain, perform or provide medically necessary abortions, but whether the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania may limit its reimbursements from state medical assistance funds to those abortions necessary to save the life of the mother without contravening the plaintiffs' rights under the Social Security Act or the United States Constitution. Read against that narrow issue, the interests asserted by the movants are remote, speculative, indirect or irrelevant. Specifically, the interests of Toomey and Lynch, as physicians, in objecting on grounds of conscience to participation in abortions is irrelevant to, and will in no way be affected by, the proceedings before us, because those proceedings concern only the funding of, and not the participation in, otherwise legal and available abortions. Further, the economic and professional interests of Toomey and Lynch as physicians who regularly treat pregnant women who may be able to procure abortions paid for by medical assistance, who may ignore the professional advice of Toomey and Lynch in seeking such an abortion and who may seek the services of another physician to perform the abortion, are speculative and remote. Neither Toomey nor Lynch has alleged any more than the mere possibility that his patients' ability to procure an abortion paid for by medical assistance might affect his economic and professional interests. But even if they had, the fact that their economic and professional interests might be affected by their patients' assertion of a legal right to an available medical procedure, voluntarily performed either by themselves or another qualified physician, does not amount to a direct, substantial legally protectable interest that would support intervention as of right in this case.
Nor do we find the interests of Dougherty, as legislator, member of the General Assembly and cosponsor of Public Act 148, to be sufficiently substantial, direct or legally protectable interests to warrant intervention. The issue before us is not whether Public Acts 16A or 148 were duly and lawfully enacted, See McRae v. Mathews, 421 F. Supp. 533, 540 (E.D.N.Y.1976), Vacated and remanded sub nom. Califano v. McRae, 433 U.S. 916, 97 S. Ct. 2993, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1103 (1977), in light of Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 97 S. Ct. 2376, 53 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1977), and Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 97 S. Ct. 2366, 53 L. Ed. 2d 464 (1977), but whether those Acts improperly conflict with a federal statute or the United States Constitution. Finally, while the interests of Toomey, Lynch and Dougherty as taxpayers who object to the expenditure of their federal and state tax dollars to fund abortions other than those necessary to save the life of the mother might, in a different context, support intervention, they are too indirect and remote to support intervention in the present case. The Legislature of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has apportioned a specific amount of money for medical assistance, See Public Act 16A, and the movants have not demonstrated that they will suffer any out-of-pocket tax losses if this case is decided adversely to their avowed interests in opposing abortions. See Fuller v. Volk, 351 F.2d 323 (3d Cir. 1965); Cf. Gravel v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 7, 9 (D.D.C.1972); But see McRae v. Mathews, supra, 421 F. Supp. at 540.
Turning to the motion of Lynch and Toomey for appointment as guardians Ad litem for unborn children, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(c), we hold that unborn children (fetuses, embryos) are not persons with a legally protectable interest within the meaning of Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(c) or 24(a)(2) and, thus, the appointment of guardians Ad litem is neither warranted nor required. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973), and cases cited in plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition to motion to intervene and for appointment of guardians Ad litem, pp. 6-8.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the movants' motions to intervene and for appointment as guardians Ad litem will be denied.
The Court welcomes the movants to submit their legal arguments to this Court in the form of a brief Amicus curiae.
An appropriate Order will be entered.
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