No. 12 March Term, 1978, Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania at No. 535 April Term, 1977, entered March 28, 1977, dismissing an appeal from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County at No. 7356 of 1976, entered January 28, 1977, Civil Division.
Allen N. Brunwasser, Pittsburgh, for appellants.
John M. Silvestri, Pittsburgh, for appellee.
Eagen, C. J., and O'Brien, Roberts, Pomeroy, Nix, Manderino and Larsen, JJ.
Appellants, Ina Brunwasser (Brunwasser) and Barbara Pugar (Pugar), seek to appeal an award by a Board of Arbitrators to the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County without first having to pay the costs of arbitration as required by a local rule of court.*fn1 Their motion for permission so to proceed was denied by the court of common pleas, and the Superior Court quashed as interlocutory their appeal from that order of denial. We granted permission to appeal from the order of the Superior Court,*fn2 and will affirm that order.
Like most counties in Pennsylvania, Allegheny County has availed itself of the Act of 1836, as amended,*fn3 by providing through local rules of court for compulsory arbitration of disputes in which the amount in controversy does not exceed a stipulated sum ($10,000 in counties of the second class).*fn4 Appeals from arbitration are provided for in Rule 306 of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, reproduced in part in the margin.*fn5 Under the terms of this rule, Brunwasser
and Pugar, in order to perfect their appeal to the court of common pleas, were required to pay $135.55 to the prothonotary of that court, being the sum of all record costs to date and $60 on account of the fees of the arbitrators, the latter item being nonrefundable under the terms of paragraph 3 of local Rule 306. As stated at the outset, the court of common pleas denied the motion*fn6 of Brunwasser and Pugar for leave to appeal without payment of the arbitration fee and court costs on the ground that the matter was covered by Rule 306, and the Superior Court quashed their appeal to that court. We agree with that action.
It is, of course, well settled that an appeal will lie only from a final order unless otherwise permitted by statute. See, e. g., T. C. R. Realty, Inc. v. Cox, 472 Pa. 331, 372 A.2d 721 (1977); Caplan v. Keystone Weaving Mill, 431 Pa. 407, ...