Union counsel then distinguished this issue from the issue of whether the employees were entitled to payment under the Zack award On its face, and Arbitrator Gill apparently agreed to the distinction.
Arbitrator Gill acknowledged in his opinion that his framing of the issue at the hearing could be read "as suggesting the broader issue posed by Union counsel" (Arbitrator's Opinion, p. 10), but looked to the Intent of the parties and concluded that "Company counsel did not understand himself to be consenting to any broadening of the issue, nor did I intend to broaden it." Id.
The Court does not read the submission so narrowly. In fact, from the limited evidence available in the moving papers it appears that the Union's interpretation of the submission is substantially correct. Counsel for RCA did not object in any way to the framing of the question in terms of "whether this grievance should be upheld on its merits in light of what was said by both arbitrator Zack and Knowlton." It must have been clear to everyone that the written grievance made no reference to the Knowlton decision, and that the Knowlton decision could only affect the Merits of the grievance at hand as a Precedent. It is also clear that the Zack grievance is included in the sentence because it too could serve as a precedent.
Courts may not review the merits of an arbitrator's decision. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corporation, 363 U.S. 593, 80 S. Ct. 1358, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1424 (1960). However, it is well established that an arbitrator may not decide matters outside the scope of the submission, and a court may overturn an arbitrator's award if he has done so. Id., pp. 597-8, 80 S. Ct. 1358. The issue presented by this case is slightly different. Here, the question is whether the court or the arbitrator is to decide what the terms of the submission were.
It would be logical for the court to decide what the submission was, because, first, a submission is a contract. The rules of contract formation present legal questions, best decided by a court. Second, if the court is to decide whether the arbitrator has exceeded the scope of the submission it is reasonable for the court to define what the terms of the submission were.
This Court does not necessarily agree with Arbitrator Gill that RCA never intended to broaden the issues submitted, and would perhaps be inclined to remand for a decision based on the Court's interpretation of the submission. The reason that the Court must instead hold for RCA is that the Collective Bargaining Agreement supports Arbitrator Gill's award. P 7.06 of the Agreement says that "all grievances shall be presented in writing on grievance forms which will be provided from time to time by the Company." Under P 7.08 arbitration is the third step of the procedure by which "duly presented grievances shall be presented and negotiated." Reading the two paragraphs together, an arbitrator could readily conclude that only written grievances are arbitrable a conclusion which would foreclose consideration of any oral modification of the submission.
The grievance in issue was in the proper form, but as written it presents only the narrow issue of whether the Moorestown employees are entitled to compensation "Due them by . . . (the Zack award)." (Emphasis supplied). Even assuming that this Court has the power to decide what the submission was, it cannot read the language of the grievance as demanding relief in accordance with the Precedent set by the Zack award. The written grievance presented the same question that the Union was trying to resolve between February, 1975, and August, 1975, i. e. whether the Zack award "on its face" covered the Moorestown employees.
If Arbitrator Gill had said in his opinion that he was obliged by the collective bargaining agreement to consider only the written grievance without oral modification, this Court would affirm his decision without hesitation, notwithstanding the statements made at hearing. Questions of procedural arbitrability are for the arbitrator to decide, John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557, 84 S. Ct. 909, 11 L. Ed. 2d 898 (1964), and the collective bargaining agreement would certainly have supported such a ruling.
In short, the Court does not agree with the reasoning that supported Arbitrator Gill's decision but finds ample support in the collective bargaining agreement for the Result that was reached; that is, that the narrow issue of the binding effect of the Zack award was the only issue properly to be considered by the arbitrator.
The law of this circuit is that an arbitrator's award must be upheld if "the interpretation can in any rational way be derived from the agreement." Ludwig Honold Manufacturing Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1969). Furthermore, "(it) is not within the province of a reviewing court to agree or to disagree with . . . the specific reasoning employed" by the arbitrator. Id. at 1132.
Another court of this District has followed Ludwig Honold On facts very similar to those of the instant case. American Can Co. v. United Papermakers and Paperworkers, AFL-CIO, 356 F. Supp. 495 (E.D.Pa.1973). There, Judge Troutman wrote:
"(Plaintiff) argues that although the arbitrator is not obliged to state his reasons, once he does so, his decision must be justified on those grounds. Here, the arbitrator rejected the union's argument that the dispute was procedural and that the contract was controlling. Plaintiff seems to argue that the decision may not now (in the court action) be justified on procedural grounds. We disagree with this assertion on the ground that under Ludwig Honold it is the Award rather than the conclusion or the specific reasoning employed that a court must review. Since we have determined that the award did not manifestly disregard the terms of the agreement . . . we may not disturb the arbitrator's award." Id., at 499-500 (Emphasis in original, footnote omitted).