any factual dispute about the status of his marriage to Judy Wancho and, absent such allegations, we cannot say that the failure of the government to provide such an opportunity to rebut constituted fundamental unfairness.
Second, the Defendant contends that the INS improperly based its denial of the Defendant's application for extension of the voluntary departure date on the annulment of his marriage, instead of on some reasoned exercise of discretion. The Defendant bases his argument on the March 14, 1975 letter from Officer Sigler to Attorney Boukis which states: "since the dissolution of the marital relationship, your client no longer derives any benefits under the immigration laws and your request must be, and is hereby denied," (Government Exhibit 6). The Government correctly points out, however, that Officer Sigler may have used this language because the Defendant's marriage was the entire basis for the Defendant's application for extension of the departure date. The annulment of the marriage eliminated the basis for the Defendant's application for extension of the voluntary departure date. Just as the INS had acted within its discretion in granting one application for extension of the departure date on the basis of the Defendant's marriage, it could properly deny further applications for extension of the voluntary departure date on the basis that the marriage had been annulled. In any event, there is no indication that the INS's decision was arbitrary, capricious, or based on an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the decision must stand.
Third, the Defendant asserts that he was not given 72 hours advance notice of the time and place at which he was to surrender completely ready for deportation, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 243.3. The Defendant was arrested on March 13, 1975 and the Defendant was not served with his deportation warrant until March 14, 1975. This delay of notice does not necessarily amount to a denial of due process. First, while the Defendant did not receive the deportation warrant until the day after he was apprehended, the Defendant was notified on August 13, 1974 that his failure to depart by September 20, 1974 would leave him subject to deportation (Government Exhibit 6, letter from Deportation Officer Kowalchik to Defendant, August 13, 1974). Furthermore, he knew that the continuation of his marriage was the basis for his request for extension of the voluntary departure date, and that the annulment of his marriage would also annul the basis for this request and might result in the withdrawal of his wife's petition for an immigration visa which in fact occurred. Second, the Defendant had almost a year from the date of his deportation hearing to arrange his personal and business affairs in anticipation of his possible deportation. While the better practice would have been to serve the deportation warrant before taking the Defendant into custody, we do not see that any fundamental unfairness resulted to the Defendant which would warrant the dismissal of the indictment. In addition to the notice the Defendant had of the imminence of his deportation if his marriage was annulled, the courts have said an alien has no constitutional right against warrantless arrest of a magnitude sufficient to require the dismissal of proceedings against him or to void any consequent deportation order, see Medina-Sandoval v. Immigration Serv., 524 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1975); La Franca v. Immigration Serv., 413 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1969); Avila-Gallegos v. Immigration Serv., 525 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1975); Tsimounis v. Holland, 132 F. Supp. 754 (E.D.Pa.1955), Aff'd 228 F.2d 907 (3d Cir. 1956). This line of decisions parallels those decisions which hold that an alien facing deportation is without the panoply of constitutional rights which criminal defendants enjoy, see, e.g., Henriques v. Immigration Serv., 465 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1972) (allegedly indigent alien not entitled to counsel at government expense when sole issue is whether he overstayed his four day visa); Ah Chiu Pang v. Immigration Serv., 368 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1966), Cert. denied 386 U.S. 1037, 87 S. Ct. 1490, 18 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1967) (aliens in deportation proceedings not entitled to counsel at government expense and notification of constitutional rights); Jolley v. Immigration Serv., supra at 1255 (alien's statements to immigration officer not inadmissible at deportation hearing because officer did not give Miranda warnings to alien).