The opinion of the court was delivered by: LUONGO
This "police brutality" case under the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 was brought against the City of Philadelphia and two of its policemen on November 18, 1975.
The plaintiff contended that he was subjected to racially motivated beatings and unlawful arrest. See 429 F. Supp. 865, 866-67 (E.D.Pa.1977); 441 F. Supp. 184, 185-87 (E.D.Pa.1977). After a three-day trial, a jury found in favor of defendants on all claims.
Defendants now have moved for an award of counsel fees.
Under the rule adhered to in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 95 S. Ct. 1612, 44 L. Ed. 2d 141 (1975), attorneys' fees generally are not recoverable in litigation absent statutory authorization. In this case, defendants rely on the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 (hereinafter, Fees Act), Pub.L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641, Amending 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which provides:
"In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of (Inter alia, the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871), the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."
There is no question that defendants were the "prevailing parties" in this case. The issue is whether, as a matter of discretion, they should be allowed to recover fees under the Act. On this matter, the report accompanying S.2278, the bill that eventually became the Fees Act, stated the following:
" "Private attorneys general' (I. e., civil rights plaintiffs) should not be deterred from bringing good faith actions to vindicate the fundamental rights here involved by the prospect of having to pay their opponent's counsel fees should they lose. Richardson v. Hotel Corporation of America, 332 F. Supp. 519 (E.D.La.1971), aff'd, 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972). (A fee award to a defendant's employer, was held unjustified where a claim of racial discrimination, though meritless, was made in good faith.) Such a party, if unsuccessful, could be assessed his opponent's fee only where it is shown that his suit was clearly frivolous, vexatious, or brought for harassment purposes. United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 385 F. Supp. 346 (W.D.Pa.1974), aff'd, (519 F.2d 359) (3d Cir. 1975). This bill thus deters frivolous suits by authorizing an award of attorneys' fees against a party shown to have litigated in "bad faith' under the guise of attempting to enforce the Federal rights created by the statutes listed in S.2278. Similar standards have been followed not only in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but in other statutes providing for attorneys' fees."
S.Rep. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, Reprinted in (1976) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5908, 5912.
The report thus makes it clear that Congress did not intend that discretion be exercised in favor of awarding fees to prevailing defendants in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has adopted that view. Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483, 489 (1978).
As the Senate report explains, the standard governing recovery of fees by defendants under the Fees Act is the same as that under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Supreme Court's explanation of the appropriate standard under Title VII, § 706(k) of the 1964 Act in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 98 S. Ct. 694, 54 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1978), therefore is instructive. In that case, the Court approved Courts of Appeals' formulations of the standard using such terms as "meritless", "frivolous", or "vexatious" to describe the losing plaintiffs' claims. The Supreme Court observed:
"To the extent that abstract words can deal with concrete cases, we think that the concept embodied in the language adopted by these . . . Courts of Appeals is correct. We would qualify their words only by pointing out that the term "meritless' is to be understood as meaning groundless or without foundation, rather than simply that the plaintiff has ultimately lost his case, and that the term "vexatious' in no way implies that the plaintiff's subjective bad faith is a necessary prerequisite to a fee award against him. In sum, a district court may in its discretion award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.
In applying these criteria, it is important that a district court resist the understandable temptation to engage in Post-hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation. This kind of hindsight logic could discourage all but the most airtight claims, for seldom can a prospective plaintiff be sure of ultimate success. No matter how honest one's belief that he has been the victim of discrimination, no matter how meritorious one's claim may appear at the outset, the course of litigation is rarely predictable. Decisive facts may not emerge until discovery or trial. The law may change or clarify in the midst of litigation. Even when the law or the facts appear questionable or unfavorable at the outset, a party may have an entirely reasonable ground for bringing suit.
434 U.S. at 421-24, 98 S. Ct. at 700-01 (emphasis in original; footnotes omitted), Quoted in part in Hughes, supra, at 489.
Applying this standard to the facts of this case, I conclude that defendants are not entitled to counsel fees. As plaintiff points out in his brief, there was sufficient basis for bringing suit in good faith in this case. There was evidence of physical injury and supporting testimony from witnesses; criminal charges that had been lodged against plaintiff by the police had been dismissed in state court; the policemen themselves had been indicted (though later acquitted) for criminal assault as a result of the incident. With that background, the case cannot be described as "frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless."
The primary question before the jury was whether the policemen used excessive force against the plaintiff. The answer to such a question rarely appears with crystal clarity; rather, it usually requires a "judgment call" by the jury, which may be reluctant to second-guess the decisions of a policeman performing his job. The fact that the jury found in favor of the policemen on the question of excessive force (or on the question of lawfulness of the arrest another inquiry not ...