according to present law, they are not entitled to a jury trial. However, plaintiffs continue to assert their demand for a jury trial "in order to preserve the point." We will dismiss their demand for a jury trial; a cause of action under employment discrimination provisions of Title VII is equitable in nature and hence, there is no right to a jury trial. Dixon v. Universal Atlas Cement Division, 437 F. Supp. 1071 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
G.A.F. in its motion to dismiss asserts that the individuals named in the complaint are not proper defendants to this suit because they were not named as respondents in the prior Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") proceedings. Plaintiffs maintain that where certain individuals bear a close relationship to a business entity, they need not be named individually in an EEOC charge as such individuals are either agents of the entity named in the charge or there is a substantial identity between the defendants.
Title VII provides, inter-alia, that a plaintiff may institute a civil action in federal court against only those employers which were respondents "named in the charge" filed with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (f) (1). This jurisdictional prerequisite is important for two reasons. First, it notifies the charged party of the asserted violation. Secondly, it brings the charged party before the EEOC and permits effectuation of the act's primary goal, the securing of voluntary compliance with the law. Jackson v. University of Pittsburgh, 405 F. Supp. 607, 615 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969).
It is uncontroverted that the individual defendants were not named in plaintiffs' initial charge with the EEOC and whether these named individuals were in fact notified of the filing of plaintiffs' charge with the EEOC is not shown by plaintiffs. There is no evidence in the record that the individual defendants had the opportunity to meet with the EEOC representatives in any conciliatory conferences and no evidence that these defendants were named in the factual allegations in the charge. Therefore, a primary goal of the act has been frustrated by the omission of these persons in the charge and the inclusion of them in the complaint. See Scott v. University of Delaware, 385 F. Supp. 937 (D. Del. 1974); Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corporation, 368 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Ca. 1973).
While we recognize that liberality in construction should be favored, especially where a lay person files the charge, Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 461 (5th Cir. 1970), we hold to the belief that the minimum standards of statutory compliance are necessary to comport with the statutory emphasis on voluntary compliance in conciliation in § 2000e-5. Therefore, the complaint against the individual defendants will be dismissed.
An appropriate order will follow.
AND NOW, to-wit, this 3rd day of July, 1978, having received defendant Great American Federal Savings and Loan Association's Motion to Dismiss and in accordance with the foregoing Opinion, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED and DECREED that plaintiffs' allegation of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 be and is dismissed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' demand for a jury trial be and is dismissed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the action against John A. Virostek, Joseph E. Bugel, John J. Dravecky, Daniel T. Kubasak, James E. Orris, Joseph A. Prokopovitsh, and John G. Micenko be and hereby is dismissed, thereby leaving Great American Federal Savings and Loan Association as the sole defendant herein.
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