Court, 571 F.2d 572 (3d Cir. 1978), the Court applied the rule of Brady to a § 301 action. We therefore hold that Brady is applicable to this case.
Plaintiffs contend in the alternative that they should not be held to this requirement because in this case the appeals set forth in the Constitution are so time-consuming that plaintiffs would be denied their rights as a practical matter. To this argument we respond by observing that Brady dealt with the same Union as the one involved in the case at bar. We note that the Union's internal procedure allows for review of the plaintiffs' contentions on union levels higher than those responsible for the decisions against them, as was the case in Brady.
Thus, we shall grant the Union's motion to dismiss for failure to utilize available intra-union remedies. We need not, therefore, consider defendant's contentions that this case should be dismissed for failure to exhaust remedies set forth in the collective bargaining agreement, and need not consider the motion to strike plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages.
We must, however, consider whether or not the dismissal of plaintiffs' action against the Union mandates dismissal of the action against RCA. We recently considered such an issue in Neipert v. Arthur G. McKee & Company, et al., 448 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Pa. 1978). In that case, we examined the law and concluded that if the available intra-union remedies did provide for the possibility of reversal of the lower Union officials' decisions and for the reinstatement of the grievance, then it would be proper to dismiss the action against the employer, since the employees could have through those procedures either obtained reinstatement of the grievance or it could have been determined that there was no breach of duty by the Union. We find that logic applicable to this case and, accordingly, we shall also dismiss the action against RCA.
AND NOW, this 9th day of June, 1978, IT IS ORDERED that the action is DISMISSED as to all parties.
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