Nos. 29 and 106 January Term, 1976, Appeal from the Judgments of Sentence of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Trial Division, Criminal Section, As of October Sessions, 1974, Nos. 1003-1006.
Julius E. Fioravanti, Philadelphia, for appellant.
F. Emmett Fitzpatrick, Dist. Atty., Steven H. Goldblatt, Asst. Dist. Atty., Chief, Appeals Div., Gale M. Barthold, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.
Jones, C. J., and Eagen, O'Brien, Roberts, Pomeroy, Nix and Manderino, JJ. Nix, J., files an Opinion in Support of Affirmance joined by O'Brien, J. Roberts, J., files an Opinion in Support of Affirmance. Eagen, C. J., files an opinion in support of reversal joined by Pomeroy, J. Manderino, J., files an opinion in support of reversal. Jones, former C. J., did not participate in the decision of this case.
The Court being equally divided the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County remains in effect.
OPINION IN SUPPORT OF AFFIRMANCE
Appellant, Damon Allen, was convicted by a jury of murder in the second degree,*fn1 robbery,*fn2 criminal conspiracy,*fn3 burglary*fn4 and possessing an instrument of crime,*fn5 in connection with the death by stabbing and beating of William Nathaniel Rupert in Philadelphia on September 25, 1974. Post-verdict motions were filed and denied. A sentence of life imprisonment was imposed for second degree murder and concurrent sentences were imposed for the other convictions, except possessing an instrument of crime, for which sentence was suspended.
In this direct appeal from all the judgments of sentence except the suspended sentence for possessing an instrument of crime, appellant contends: (1) that his waiver of Miranda rights was defective because he was a juvenile and was not given an opportunity to consult with an informed and interested adult; (2) that the length of time and change of circumstances between his original Miranda warnings and his confession necessitated re-warning; (3) that his confession was the product of an illegal arrest; (4) that the trial judge improperly limited voir dire questioning as to prospective jurors' home addresses; and (5) that it was error to refuse to ...