"route-supervisor." From December 1968 until September 1972 he worked in the sales department, calling on wholesale accounts to sell bottled water. (Presumably he drove a vehicle to service these accounts). All this service appears to fall appropriately within the classification of route drivers or salesmen.
The only questionable item is his acting as "route-supervisor" where he was responsible for "making sure that the driver salesmen carried out their jobs properly in delivering customer products and soliciting new accounts." This task seems like the work of a glorified driver salesman, pursuing the same type of business as before, but acting on a larger scale through other drivers and salesmen and ensuring their proper performance of the customary work. From 1972 on he was a branch manager.
He did not negotiate any labor contracts; nor does it appear that he exercised any of the disciplinary powers of the sort enumerated in 29 U.S.C. 152(11).
We conclude that Eich is eligible.
Lawrence G. Irr was a salesman and cooler installer. "On a daily basis I had to personally load my assigned company vehicle with coolers and product." The only difference in his work and that of regular route-salesmen was that he made the initial contract with the customer, and set up the equipment for new accounts. The driver on the route serving that locality then took over upkeep. Irr also filled special orders where the route salesman was out of product or inadvertently failed to call on a customer.
Irr specifically denies ever exercising disciplinary powers or negotiating labor contracts.
The problem with Irr is that his work seems to fit a classification covered by the contract with Local 249 rather than that with Local 250, of which Irr was a member.
However, the definition in Article I, Section 1.1 of the 1976 contract is sufficiently broad to permit eligibility to any person whose occupation is "in a classification in a collective bargaining unit represented by a local unit affiliated with Joint Council 40." [Italics supplied]. This language does not require that an employee's occupation be classified in the contract with the union of which he is a member; it suffices that the classification be found in a contract with a union affiliated with Teamsters' Joint Council 40. Hence since Irr's occupation falls within a classification covered by the contract with Local 249, he is eligible even though his own membership was in Local 250.
We conclude that Irr is eligible.
Paul R. Baker, now retired and applicant for a pension, was a commercial water cooler salesman from 1960 until 1976. He sold and rented water coolers to customers. This was a function performed by driver salesmen.
He specifically denies any exercise of disciplinary powers or contract negotiating.
What was said about Irr applies to Baker. Though he was also a member of the wrong union (Local 250), he is eligible since the type of work he did is covered by a classification in the contract with Local 249.
We conclude that Baker is eligible, and entitled to a pension in accordance with the plan since he is now retired.
Ralph D. Conte has been president of Polar Water Co. since June, 1964. From January 1955 until June 1964 he was general manager of the company, and was elected vice-president in 1963.
He states that on occasion he fills in when needed doing work of the type done by union members. However, it can not well be said that such work is his "primary occupation." His duties as general manager, vice-president, and president of the company would preclude that.
Moreover, he does not deny, and could not deny, that as a company official he would be bound to exercise disciplinary functions and contract negotiation when occasions arose for such activity.
That he is a union member does not establish his right to pension benefits. As well stated in Plaintiff's brief, p. 9
The provisions of the Pension Plan do not require union membership as a prerequisite for eligibility for pension benefits. Rather, the Pension Plan requires only that an individual be employed "in a classification in a collective bargaining unit represented by a local union affiliated with Joint Council 40." Thus, the mere fact that an individual Defendant is a member of Local 249 or Local 250 is not in any manner determinative of whether the individual is eligible for pension benefits.