However, the record in this case -- which we have set forth explicitly, supra -- clearly establishes that Griffin was not sentenced to two separate twenty year terms for the § 2113 violations. Instead, he received a general forty year sentence on the merged counts.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has explicitly approved the use of a general sentence in such situations, stating that the only practicable way of avoiding the Prince problem "is to impose a general sentence on all counts for a term not exceeding the maximum permissible sentence on that count which carries the greatest maximum sentence." United States v. Corson, 449 F.2d 544, 551 (3d Cir. 1971). The sentence which we imposed upon Griffin was completely in accord with the Corson principle. Griffin faced a maximum sentence of "not less than ten years or punished by death if the verdict of the jury shall so direct," under Count IX, for violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2(a), 2113(e); therefore, the imposition of a general forty year sentence on all of the bank robbery counts (Counts III, V, and IX), was legal. See, United States v. Atkins, 558 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1977).
The Third Circuit decisions in the Corson and Atkins cases clearly sanction the imposition of a general sentence on multiple counts charging violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a), 2113(e). See also, Sullivan v. United States, 485 F.2d 1352 (5th Cir. 1973). Accordingly, we must reject any claim by Griffin that the general forty year sentence which we actually imposed on Counts III, V, and IX, was in any way illegal.
Nor does Griffin's allegation that we imposed two distinct twenty year terms -- rather than a general forty year sentence -- compel a different result. First, as we have already noted, such an allegation is completely unsupported by the factual record in this case, which shows beyond any conceivable question that it was in fact a general forty year sentence which was imposed on the substantive bank robbery counts. Secondly, we reject any argument by Griffin that, although the sentence may have been formally imposed as a general sentence, it was in essence or in actuality a series of shorter sentences. See, Choice v. United States, 415 F. Supp. 369 (E.D.Pa. 1976) (denying § 2255 petitioner's challenge to legality of general sentence imposed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2113).
Finally, although Griffin does not appear to challenge the concurrent five year term of imprisonment which we imposed on the conspiracy count (Count I), we note that the imposition of such a sentence, under the circumstances present here, is completely legal. Choice v. United States, supra, 415 F. Supp. at 370, and cases cited therein.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we hold that the sentence imposed upon Griffin was an entirely legal one. Because the motion, and the files and records in the case, conclusively showed that the petitioner was entitled to no relief, no evidentiary hearing was necessary. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 227 n. 8, 22 L. Ed. 2d 227, 89 S. Ct. 1068 (1969). Accord, Brown v. United States, 556 F.2d 224 (3d Cir. 1977). For these reasons the motion was dismissed.
BY THE COURT:
HERBERT A. FOGEL, J. United States District Court
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