The opinion of the court was delivered by: TEITELBAUM
Plaintiff has filed a three count complaint in the instant action.
The first count names the Sharon School District as the defendant and is brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and alleges that the plaintiff was a school teacher who became pregnant and due to the existing policy of the School District, was required to and did in fact submit a letter of resignation dated July of 1970,
said letter being accepted by the School Board in August of 1970, and the plaintiff further alleges that the letter of resignation was as a result of pressure placed upon her and her family by individual members of the School Board, said members not being specifically named. Plaintiff further alleges that she has made numerous attempts to be reinstated to her teaching position, but does not set forth the dates or the manner in which said attempts were made and alleges that the action of the School District in forcing her to resign in 1970 was in violation of practices made unlawful by Title VII and that the Board's continuing to hire other teachers rather than herself constitutes a continuing act of discrimination in violation of Title VII as well as an action of retaliation against her in violation of Section 704(a) of Title VII.
Under Count Two, the plaintiff asserts an action against the School District, all members of the Board who were such members in the year of 1970, and many of the individual members of the Board who have served since that time up to the present, as well as the Superintendent who was Superintendent at the time of the alleged action and has been such up to the present time. This Count is allegedly maintained under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, with jurisdiction predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(3) and 1343(4). It is being alleged under Count Two that the Superintendent and the members of the School Board were acting under color of law, forcing plaintiff to submit her resignation and also in failing to rehire or reinstate plaintiff to her former position.
In Count Three of her complaint, the plaintiff alleges that she is seeking damages and redress under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act in bringing suit against all parties previously mentioned.
All of the defendants at the present time are represented by the School Board Solicitor.
The defendants have now moved to dismiss Counts One through Three of the complaint, to strike Exhibit C of plaintiff's complaint and to obtain a more definite statement.
"Motion to Dismiss Count One"
Plaintiff's failure to file charges with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission is not fatal to her cause of action. The EEOC follows an accepted practice known as "deferral," whereby premature charges are referred to the appropriate state or local agency, without being considered as "filed" with the EEOC, thereby preventing plaintiffs from losing any rights under Title VII because they mistakenly came to the EEOC first. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 30 L. Ed. 2d 679, 92 S. Ct. 616 (1972). Plaintiff's charges, filed with the EEOC on February 22, 1975, were not deferred to the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission because the plaintiff executed a waiver of deferral on April 4, 1975 and as a result the commission waived jurisdiction in accordance with an agreement between the EEOC and itself. By waiving jurisdiction, "such proceedings have been earlier terminated," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), thereby validating the EEOC charges.
The question of the timeliness of plaintiff's EEOC complaint is the subject of our next inquiry. While plaintiff resigned in 1970, she did not file her complaint with the EEOC until 1975. However, subsequent discriminatory practices following a resignation can provide the jurisdictional basis for an EEOC charge. Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand Company, 331 F. Supp. 1184 (W.D. Pa. 1971); 477 F.2d 1038 (3d Cir. 1973). In Jurinko the Court of Appeals adopted the following statement of this Court:
"The company contends that because the charge was filed with the Commission more than 90 days after the original meeting in June of 1965, it was untimely, and therefore this Court lacks jurisdiction of this action. Section 2000e-5(d) of 42 U.S.C. does provide that charges with the Commission shall be filed within 90 days of the occurrence of the alleged unlawful employment practice. It is clear, however, that the plaintiff's reapplication in June of 1966 represents the occurrence of an ...