Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Constructors Association of Western Pennsylvania v. Kreps

argued: January 3, 1978.

CONSTRUCTORS ASSOCIATION OF WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA, APPELLANT
v.
JUANITA KREPS, SECRETARY OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, MILTON J. SHAPP, GOVERNOR OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; AND RICHARD CALIGUIRI, MAYOR OF THE CITY OF PITTSBURGH



On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. C.A. No. 77-1035.

Adams, Gibbons and Garth, Circuit Judges.

Author: Adams

Opinion OF THE COURT

ADAMS, Circuit Judge

The question in this case is whether the district court abused its discretion in declining to issue a preliminary injunction enjoining the United States Department of Commerce, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the City of Pittsburgh from complying with a federal statute which requires 10% of all federal funds in specified public works projects to be allocated to "minority business enterprises."

A. FACTS

In July of 1976, Congress enacted the Local Public Works Capital Development and Investment Act (LPW).*fn1 The LPW established a program to distribute two billion dollars to state and local governments for public works projects in order to stimulate the national economy. In January of 1977, legislation was introduced to provide additional funding of the LPW, denominated "Round II." Because under "Round I" only 1% of the funds allocated to state and local governments had reached minority contractors, the LPW was amended in mid-1977 to require that 10% of the amount of each LPW grant be expended in connection with contracts with "minority business enterprises" (MBEs), unless the Secretary of Commerce waives the requirement.*fn2

Under the LPW program, the City of Pittsburgh requested grants totaling $11,000,000, and the Department of Transportation, of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, applied for a similar amount of funds. By September 30, 1977, Pittsburgh had received approval for approximately $9,000,000 worth of projects, and the Department of Transportation had received approval of seven projects costing over $11,000,000. Since the LPW required that construction on any project begin within 90 days of the allocation of a grant, bidding for the Pittsburgh and the Department of Transportation projects proceeded on accelerated schedules.

On September 8, 1977, the Constructors Association of Western Pennsylvania, a 95-member non-profit association of heavy construction contractors, filed a complaint in the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania attacking the legislation on the ground that the MBE requirement discriminated against its members, who were all white, in violation of the equal protection components of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Association sought a temporary restraining order to prohibit Pittsburgh, the Transportation Department of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the Secretary of Commerce from enforcing or taking action to solicit or to accept bids based on the MBE requirement. The Association also requested injunctive and declaratory relief.

After notice and hearing, Judge Daniel J. Snyder on September 12, 1977, denied the request for a temporary restraining order. He held a hearing on September 30, 1977, regarding the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction. In an opinion dated October 13, 1977, Judge Snyder denied the request for a preliminary injunction. This appeal from that denial followed.*fn3

B. THE STANDARDS

The narrow issue before us is whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant the preliminary injunction sought by the plaintiff.*fn4 Our analysis of the plaintiff's contention that such an abuse did, in fact, occur is framed initially by the factors which the district court was required to take into account in evaluating an application for a preliminary injunction. "The traditional standard for granting a preliminary injunction requires the plaintiff to show that in the absence of its issuance, he will suffer irreparable injury and also that he is likely to prevail on the merits."*fn5 More specifically, this Court has consistently identified four factors which must be examined in ascertaining the propriety of a preliminary injunction:

While these factors structure the inquiry, however, no one aspect will necessarily determine its outcome. Rather, proper judgment entails a "delicate balancing" of all elements.*fn7 On the basis of the data before it, the district court must attempt to minimize the probable harm to legally protected interests between the time that the motion for a preliminary injunction is filed and the time of the final hearing.*fn8

Thus, for example, in a situation where factors of irreparable harm, interests of third parties and public considerations strongly favor the moving party, an injunction might be appropriate "even though plaintiffs did not demonstrate as strong a likelihood of ultimate success as would generally be required."*fn9 In contrast, where the threatened irreparable injury is limited or is balanced to a substantial degree by countervailing injuries which would result to third parties, or to the public interest from the issuance of an ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.