Development Administration from paying to the Big Beaver Falls Area School District the grant allocated to it on the grounds that the award of a grant to the Big Beaver Falls Area School District violated certain statutory conditions and was an abuse of administrative discretion subject to judicial review under the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706.
A motion for hearing on plaintiff's prayer for preliminary injunction was filed, a time was set for hearing and submission of briefs and a hearing was held on October 27, 1977. The parties submitted voluminous materials by way of briefs and the hearing proceeded on arguments of law on the assumption that there was no genuine issue as to any of the material facts. At the conclusion of the hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction it was stipulated that the record of said hearing should constitute the record of final hearing on the matter, there being no desire by the parties to present any further evidentiary materials.
There is no dispute between the parties that the court has jurisdiction over this matter by reason of a federal question involved. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
We do not find the action subject to dismissal for failure to join the Big Beaver Falls Area School District because we do not find the presence of that party necessary on this record to determine the relief requested by the plaintiff.
Preliminary relief is an extraordinary remedy and the granting of a preliminary injunction is a matter of discretion in the trial court. It should only be granted when clearly justified by the circumstances of the case. Factors to be considered in the granting of a preliminary injunction are (1) the threat of irreparable harm to the plaintiff if the injunction is not granted; (2) the balance between the harm to the plaintiff by the denial of the injunction and the injury that would be imposed upon the defendant by granting the injunction; (3) the probability that the plaintiff will ultimately prevail on the merits of the case, and the balancing of the public interest involved.
A number of local government units have sought equitable relief against these same defendants in cases arising out of their administration of the predecessor act of 1976. While the ground of attack in each case has varied according to its own circumstance the same general principles apply to the resolution of the dispute. The courts considering these cases have uniformly denied the relief sought on the general basis of lack of a showing of irreparable injury. See City of Grand Rapids v. Richardson, 429 F. Supp. 1087 (W.D. Mich. 1977); City of Benton Harbor v. Richardson, 429 F. Supp. 1096 (W.D. Mich. 1977); Lewis v. Richardson, 428 F. Supp. 1164 (D. Mass. 1977), and the following cases for which no reporter citations are presently available: Valley Center School District v. United States, No. 77-127T (Southern District of California, March 22, 1977); City of Newburgh v. Secretary of Commerce, No. 77-127 (Southern District of New York, June 20, 1977); Town of Narragansett v. Kreps, No. 77-057 (District Rhode Island, February 4, 1977); Joram v. Richardson, No. 77-339 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); County of Calaveras v. United States, No. 77-79 (E.D. Cal. 1977).
All of the above cited cases arose under what is designated as Round I of the Local Public Works Program, the 1976 appropriation. In general they allege administrative failures to apply the statutory mandate correctly.
In Metropolitan Dade County, Florida v. Kreps et al, Civil Action No. 77-1300 (U.S. District Court, D.C.) a case arising under what is designated as "Round II" or the 1977 appropriation, the court remarked:
No one applicant, including Metropolitan Dade County, possesses a vested right to funds under the LPW Act as amended. City of Benton Harbor v. Richardson, 429 F. Supp. 1096 (W.D. Mich. 1977); see Mil-Ka Ko Research and Development Corp. v. Office of Economic Opportunity, 352 F. Supp. 169, 173 (D. D.C. 1972), aff'd. 162 U.S. App. D.C. 97, 497 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1974). As was the case with the original LPW Act, the amended legislation has as its "overriding purpose" the reduction of unemployment, rather than construction of specific public works projects in particular areas. City of Benton Harbor v. Richardson, supra, at 1101. Had it been the intent of Congress to create a vested right for the plaintiff and thousands of other applicants under the Round II program, it would have appropriated sufficient amounts to fund all eligible project applications. This was not done. It is, therefore, doubtful that plaintiff's inability to fulfill a unilateral expectation of augmented Round II funding rises to the level of irreparable harm. It should also be noted that the approximately $20 million in Round II funds designated by EDA for the Dade County-wide area will partially relieve the unemployment in Metropolitan Dade County, as well as within the municipal boundaries of other Dade County area grantees.