and methamphetamine and not names of chemical components necessary for the manufacture of those drugs.
On rebuttal, the Government introduced evidence that Charles had not in fact thrown the chemicals received at the McDade Mall in the river, as he had testified.
In ruling upon Charles' and Grayson's motions for judgment of acquittal, we must determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the Government, was such that a jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants were guilty as charged. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 86 L. Ed. 680, 62 S. Ct. 457 (1942); United States v. Miah, supra, 433 F. Supp. at 264; United States v. Phifer, 400 F. Supp. 719, 724 (E.D.Pa. 1974), aff'd mem., 532 F.2d 748 (3d Cir. 1976). Evidence which is sufficient to support a conviction need not be direct, but such conviction may be supported by circumstantial evidence. United States v. Miah, supra, 433 F. Supp. at 264. In general, and as applied to this case, to support a conviction for a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, the Government must produce sufficient evidence that Charles and Grayson: (1) willfully formed and participated in the conspiracy at about the time alleged in the indictment; (2) willfully became a member of the conspiracy; (3) one or the other knowingly committed at least one of the overt acts charged in the indictment, at or about the time and place alleged; and (4) such overt act was knowingly done in furtherance of some object or purpose of the conspiracy, as charged in the indictment. United States v. Thompson, 533 F.2d 1006, 1009 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 939, 97 S. Ct. 353, 50 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1976) (citations omitted). The defendants do not deny that they willfully became a member of the conspiracy, nor do they deny that one or the other of them knowingly committed at least one of the overt acts charged in the indictment at or about the time and place alleged, nor that such overt act was knowingly done in furtherance of some object or purpose of the conspiracy. Therefore, the only issue before the Court is whether or not the defendants possessed the requisite intent to conspire to violate 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
Charles and Grayson set forth alternative arguments that there was insufficient evidence produced by the Government that they possessed the requisite intent to violate 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Their first argument is that they cannot be held to have possessed the intention to manufacture methamphetamine, as charged in the indictment, where the Government failed to produce evidence of the actual elements necessary for the manufacture of methamphetamine and where evidence was produced at trial that the chemicals requested by the defendants of the agents could not in fact be used to produce methamphetamine. The well settled answer to this argument is that it is not necessary that the evidence produced by the Government in support of a conviction based upon 21 U.S.C. § 846 show that the defendants were successful in accomplishing the object of the conspiracy nor that they possessed the ingredients necessary to the successful completion of the object of the conspiracy. United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 85-86, 59 L. Ed. 1211, 35 S. Ct. 682 (1915); United States v. Rueter, 536 F.2d 296, 298 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Meyers, 529 F.2d 1033, 1037 (7th Cir. 1976). The essence of the crime of conspiracy is the agreement to commit the object of the conspiracy, not the completion of the substantive crime which is the object of the conspiracy. The crime is complete once the agreement is made. United States v. Rueter, supra, 536 F.2d at 298; United States v. Garramone, 380 F. Supp. 590, 592 (E.D.Pa.), aff'd mem., 506 F.2d 1050 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992, 95 S. Ct. 1428, 43 L. Ed. 2d 673 (1975). We find that the Government produced sufficient evidence by which the jury could have concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Charles and Grayson agreed or conspired to manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
The second argument set forth by Charles and Grayson is that the evidence failed to show that they possessed the requisite intent to support a conviction based upon 18 U.S.C. § 846. The Government produced evidence at trial that Charles and Grayson met with federal agents and discussed the manufacture of illegal substances, that they gave the agents lists of chemicals and that Charles actually received chemicals from the agents. The defendants each took the stand in his own defense and testified to the intent behind his actions. We find that the Government produced sufficient evidence, both direct and circumstantial, by which the jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants intended to conspire to violate 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1). The credibility of the witnesses and the determination of whether or not the defendants did indeed possess the requisite intent were, therefore, questions of fact for the jury. United States v. Thompson, supra, 533 F.2d at 1009. These issues are foreclosed by the jury's verdict of guilty against each of the defendants. Glasser v. United States, supra, 315 U.S. at 80; United States v. Miah, supra, 433 F. Supp. at 264.
We hold, therefore, that Charles' and Grayson's motions for judgment of acquittal, pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(c), should be denied.
An Order in support of this Memorandum Opinion was filed by the Court on October 7, 1977.
LOUIS C. BECHTLE, J.