into the stream of commerce, thereby doing business in this state as a non-qualified foreign corporation. 42 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. §§ 8309(a)(3) and 8302(a) (1975).
I cannot agree with plaintiff's contention that Erskine's preparation of a bill of lading is sufficient to constitute "doing business" under § 8309(a)(3). Those cases cited by plaintiff as supportive of this theory all involve a manufacturer, importer, or distributor of goods shipped directly or indirectly into Pennsylvania. Scafati v. Bayerische Motoren Werke, A.G., 53 F.R.D. 256 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Smiley v. Gemini Investment Corp., 333 F. Supp. 1047 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Benn v. Linden Crane Co., 326 F. Supp. 995 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969). My research has failed to disclose a single case in this state in which a freight forwarder, whose only task was to prepare a shipping document pursuant to the instructions of its client, has been found to be "doing business" within § 8309(a)(3). In my opinion, the mere preparation of one bill of lading by a freight forwarder is a far too tenuous relationship to a shipment of goods to be considered "doing business". This is particularly true where the bill of lading itself did not indicate that the goods would be shipped into or through Pennsylvania, and where the forwarder had no notice that the vessel involved might call at a Pennsylvania port. In fact, the discharge of the cargo at Philadelphia was wholly contrary to the shipping instructions of the bill of lading.
Despite the fact that Erskine's conduct with respect to this shipment does not rise to the level of "doing business", jurisdiction may nevertheless be sustained upon a finding of minimum contacts with the forum state in the constitutional sense. Controlled Metals, Inc. v. Non-Ferrous International Corp., 410 F. Supp. 339 (E.D. Pa. 1976). In essence, due process requires the existence of minimum contacts with the forum state "such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158, 90 L. Ed. 95, 102 (1945).
Both parties cite Proctor & Schwartz, Inc. v. Cleveland Lumber Co., 228 Pa. Super. 12, 323 A.2d 11 (1974) as setting forth the guidelines for a determination of whether the requisite minimum contacts are present in a given case.
"First, the defendant must have purposefully availed itself of the privilege of acting within the forum state thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. Hanson v. Denckla, [357 U.S. 235, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283 (1958)]. Secondly, the cause of action must arise from defendant's activities within the forum state. See Southern Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1968); Electric Regulator Corp. v. Sterling Extruder Corp., 280 F. Supp. 550 (D.Conn. 1968). Lastly, the acts of the defendant must have a substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over it reasonable. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra. . . ." 228 Pa. Super. at 19, 323 A.2d at 15.