The opinion of the court was delivered by: NEALON
James Skipper (plaintiff) filed this action to review the decision of the Appeals Council acting for the Secretary of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare (Secretary) denying his application for "Black Lung" benefits. The case was assigned to a magistrate and he has recommended that the Court grant the Secretary's motion for summary judgment which is now before the Court.
At the evidentiary hearing before the ALJ, plaintiff testified that he worked from 1934 to 1937 as a mine laborer for the Flynn and McGinnley Coal Companies and from 1938 to 1960 as a blacksmith helper in the Exeter Shops of the Glen Alden Coal Company. He formerly testified that while employed at the Exeter Shops he repaired coal mine equipment which was covered with coal dust upon coming to the shops from the mines and that on occasions he went to the colleries to repair mine cages or equipment located in the mine. The record contains a statement from Julius John Parini that plaintiff worked for him at the Flynn Coal Company for approximately three years between 1934 and 1937 but doesn't contain any corroboration or verification of plaintiff's employment with the McGinnley Coal Company. George Plethean, who was the foreman of the Exeter Shops from 1956 to 1960, submitted a statement that plaintiff worked in the Exeter Shops from 1936 to 1960 and that he repaired coal mining equipment covered with coal dust. Plethean also stated, however, that he did not recall plaintiff ever leaving the shop to work in the colliery. It appears that the Appeals Council accepted this part of Plethean's testimony and rejected the contrary claims of the plaintiff.
Generally speaking, in order to be entitled to "Black Lung" benefits, a living applicant must prove
(1) that he is totally disabled;
(2) that his disability is caused by pneumoconiosis or a chronic respiratory condition which may be presumed to be pneumoconiosis; and
(3) that his respiratory condition arose from employment in a coal mine or mines.
Since the Appeals Council determined that the presumption was not available to plaintiff, it was obliged to consider this action under the general rules of eligibility, which require that the applicant submit evidence which establishes that the three elements of a claim are present. The Appeals Council noted that, on the basis of his ventilatory function study, plaintiff had established both the existence of pneumoconiosis and the fact that he was totally disabled. In denying his claim for benefits, however, the Appeals Council held that the third element was not present since the evidence established that plaintiff's condition arose from his employment in the Exeter Shops and not from coal mine employment. On this issue, the Appeals Council made specific reference to the fact that plaintiff himself testified that his breathing problems arose after he left actual coal mine work and had begun working at the Exeter Shops.
A coal mine is defined in 20 C.F.R. § 410.110(h) as "an area of land and all structures . . . placed upon . . . the surface of such land . . . used in, to be used in, or resulting from the work of extracting in such area . . . anthracite from its natural deposits in the earth by any means or method . . .." At issue in this case is whether the Exeter Shops fit within this definition and the crucial question with respect to this issue is whether the shops were used in "the work of" extracting coal.
The work performed in the Exeter Shops did not, in itself, involve the extraction of coal. It was, however, part of the overall process because coal can not be extracted without properly functioning mining equipment. Cf. Roberts v. Weinberger, 527 F.2d 600, 602 (4th Cir. 1975). In the opinion of the Court, this is sufficient to satisfy section 410.110(h) which requires only that the structure be involved in "the work of" extracting coal. This language and the remedial purpose of the Act indicate to the Court that § 410.110(h) should be construed broadly.
The Court draws additional support for this conclusion from the decision in Adlesberger v. Mathews, 543 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1976) and Roberts v. Weinberger, supra. In Aldesberger, it was established that the appellant who was a clerical employee of a coal mine "acted as the intermediary between the office and the other miners, going into an area defined as part of the mine, underneath the tipple, to direct the switching of grates and of railroad cars." She was also responsible for "all the coal weighing whether the coal was to be shipped out of the mine by rail or truck" and "got just as much dust" as those working in the tipple. Aldesberger v. Mathews, 543 F.2d at 84. The Court of Appeals concluded that these duties fell within "the work of preparing coal." In Roberts, it was established that the late husband of the claimant "operated a truck hauling coal from the immediate site of its extraction in a strip mine to a tipple where it was processed, graded and loaded into railroad cars for further shipment." Roberts v. Weinberger, 527 F.2d at 601. The Court of Appeals then awarded benefits on the grounds that "coal was not extracted and prepared until it was taken from the ...